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Note
Somebody’s Tracking Me: Applying Use Restrictions to
Facial Recognition Tracking
Matthew E. Cavanaugh*
A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing
into the public sphere.
–Chief Justice John Roberts, Carpenter v. United States
The future of surveillance is a future of use restrictions.
–Orin Kerr

INTRODUCTION
In the very near future, the technology will be in place for all public movements to be recorded. As you walk down the street, a network
of cameras will capture your movements and be able to identify you
from your facial features. Facial-recognition-capable cameras will
watch from shop windows, from telephone poles, and from body cameras worn by patrolling police officers. Every person will carry at least
one such camera with them on their phone.
All of this data will be fed into centralized databases, where it can
be stored indefinitely. At any time, the police will be able to enter your
name into a database and review a log of every place your face has
been recorded, including precisely how long you stayed there.1 They
will also be able to query a particular location for the names of anyone
whose face was recorded there, including yours. They can do so on a

* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to thank
Professor Alan Rozenshtein for his thoughts and feedback throughout the Note-writing process. I would also like to thank the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review
for their editorial work on this Note, especially Sarah Nelson and Melanie Griffith. Finally, I would like to thank Kelsey Goergen for her encouragement and support. Copyright © 2021 by Matthew E. Cavanaugh.
1. See Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Hiding in Plain Sight: A Fourth Amendment
Framework for Analyzing Government Surveillance in Public, 66 EMORY L.J. 527, 540–42
(2017) (describing combination of surveillance cameras and storage for later access).
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hunch, and without constitutional oversight, because none of this constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.2
This future is closer than you may think. It is largely in place in
China3 and is rapidly progressing in the United States. Cities across the
country are constructing massive networks of cameras equipped with
facial recognition technology, with little oversight governing its use.4
This detection apparatus is compounded by social media—in January
2020, the New York Times reported that police departments across the
country are using Clearview, an app that enables its users to identify
a person by comparing their face to a database of three billion photos
compiled from Facebook, LinkedIn, and other social media.5
Rapid advances in technology in the twentieth century led to a
growth in state surveillance power that was mostly unchecked by the
courts. However, in 2018, the Supreme Court indicated a new approach to technological surveillance in the landmark decision Carpenter v. United States.6 There, the Court held that the acquisition of seven
days of cell-site location information (CSLI) records by police constituted a search.7
While Carpenter is a step in the right direction, constitutional
gaps remain. One such issue is the distinction between how data is
collected and how it is used, which has not been explicitly recognized
2. See infra Part II.B.
3. See, e.g., Emily Feng, How China Is Using Facial Recognition Technology, NPR
(Dec. 16, 2019, 4:24 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/16/788597818/how-china
-is-using-facial-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/N5LX-3B7H] (describing
Chinese facial recognition-powered surveillance apparatus that tracks individuals and
groups them by ethnicity); see also Ross Andersen, The Panopticon Is Already Here, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/
china-ai-surveillance/614197 [https://perma.cc/NG4P-6V46] (describing China’s extensive use of facial recognition to monitor its Uighur population); Richard Van Noorden, The Ethical Questions that Haunt Facial-Recognition Research, NATURE (Nov. 18,
2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03187-3 [https://perma.cc/
J6P2-PPXH] (same).
4. See infra Part I.B.
5. See Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know
It, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/
clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/8DMW-73FD]; see also
Ryan Mac, Caroline Haskins & Logan McDonald, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has
Been Used by the Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, WalMart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Feb. 27, 2020, 3:43 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/
clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/B4RW-GBR9]. Note
that, at the time of this writing, Clearview and its use are surrounded by questions,
both legal and otherwise.
6. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
7. Id. at 2217 n.3.
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by the courts. The concept of use restrictions attempts to address this
gap. Use restrictions are grounded in the idea that in a digital world,
how data is used raises a distinct (and potentially more important)
Fourth Amendment issue than how the data was acquired.8 This Note
argues that the Fourth Amendment limits the ability of law enforcement to track the population by using the fruits of facial recognition
technology and that the courts should employ use restrictions to protect this right.
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I begins by describing how
facial recognition technology works, how it can be used to track people, and the ongoing development of sophisticated networks of cameras and databases across the United States that will make such tracking possible. Part I concludes with an overview of how Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has developed alongside changing technology and policing methods in recent years, leading to the introduction of a new mode of analysis presented in Carpenter.
Part II argues that facial recognition tracking is a dangerous
threat to liberty. It begins with a discussion of the effects of police surveillance on individuals and populations and explains why Fourth
Amendment restraints on state power are distinct from concerns
about a more general erosion of privacy. Part II then argues that both
the collection of data and the use of that data can constitute potential
Fourth Amendment searches and that even if facial identification is
not considered a search, the aggregation of multiple points of identification to provide location information should be. Part II concludes by
arguing that the unbridled use of a surveillance apparatus to track individuals’ movements violates the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches.
Part III argues for a way forward through applying the Fourth
Amendment to the use of facial recognition tracking based on the principles stated in Carpenter. Part III argues that (1) the use of seven days
of aggregated facial recognition data constitutes a search under Carpenter and (2) any aggregation of such data should be considered a
Fourth Amendment search. Part III argues that this approach strikes
the proper balance between individual rights and society’s broader interests and concludes by considering how this approach might interact with the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

8. See Harold J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the
Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49, 50–53 (1995) (arguing that law enforcement’s
use of certain kinds of lawfully acquired information should be governed by the Fourth
Amendment).
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I. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, SURVEILLANCE AND
POWER, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
This Part provides an overview of facial recognition technology,
how it can be used to track people, and how courts have struggled to
apply the Fourth Amendment to surveillance technologies. It begins
by describing the mechanics of facial recognition technology and how
that technology can be used by law enforcement. It then describes the
growth of a network of cameras equipped with facial recognition technology in American cities, as well as the large databases that enable
the matching of a person’s image to their identity. This Part concludes
by describing the ongoing struggle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to reckon with the meaning of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the face of rapidly changing technology, culminating with Carpenter v. United States.
A. FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY
Facial recognition technology is a computer process that uses artificial intelligence and machine learning to identify an individual by
their facial features.9 It is one of a series of technologies known as “biometrics,” which use some physiological or behavioral characteristic
to identity a person.10 At a high level, facial recognition can be understood as a computer generating probabilities that an image of a person
matches an image in a database.11
1. The Mechanics of Facial Recognition
The facial recognition process works as follows. First, an algorithm converts photos or images of human faces (called “probe
9. See Kristine Hamann & Rachel Smith, Facial Recognition Technology: Where
Will It Take Us?, 34 CRIM. JUST. 9, 9–10 (2019). For an overview of the mechanics of the
technology, see generally HANDBOOK OF FACE RECOGNITION (Stan Z. Li & Anil K. Jain eds.,
2005) (describing the mechanics of pattern recognition broadly and facial recognition
specifically).
10. See LISA S. NELSON, AMERICA IDENTIFIED 1 (2011) (providing an overview of biometrics and defining biometric technologies as “automated methods of verifying or
recognizing the identity of a living person based on a physiological or behavioral characteristic”).
11. See generally The Complete Guide to Facial Recognition Technology, PANDA SEC.
(Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.pandasecurity.com/mediacenter/panda-security/facial
-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/ENB5-MYLC] (providing a comprehensive
explanation of the facial recognition process); Adam Geitgey, Machine Learning Is Fun!
Part 4: Modern Face Recognition with Deep Learning, MEDIUM (July 24, 2016), https://
medium.com/@ageitgey/machine-learning-is-fun-part-4-modern-face-recognition
-with-deep-learning-c3cffc121d78 [https://perma.cc/2S99-DGA3] (describing machine learning process for facial recognition).
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photos”12) to a numerical code, called a faceprint. Importantly, a probe
photo can come from anywhere—it can be an image the system captures in real-time, a photograph taken in the past, or an image of a person pulled from their social media page.13 The facial features analyzed
by a facial recognition system include “nodal points,” which are distinguishable landmarks on an individual’s face.14 Because any given individual has around eighty nodal points, facial recognition programs are
able to use each individual’s face to assign that individual a unique
identifying number.15
Once the probe photo becomes a number, the next step is for the
algorithm to match that number against a database of photos, i.e.,
codes, to generate a probability that the probe photo is the person in
the database.16 For facial recognition technology to effectively identify
an individual, the system must have access to a database of photos to
compare against the probe photo.17 Each photo in the database is converted to a unique value (a “template”) using the same process that
creates a numerical value for probe photos.18 Then, an algorithm compares the two values, resulting in a similarity or “match” score that
estimates the probability that the photos are of the same person.19

12. See Hamann & Smith, supra note 9, at 10. For one example of this terminology
being used by a law enforcement agency, see U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACE RECOGNITION POLICY DEVELOPMENT TEMPLATE (2017) (referring to “probe photos” throughout
the document).
13. See, e.g., PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., ONGOING FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 2:
IDENTIFICATION 2 (2018) (describing probe photos as including “reasonably well-controlled live portrait photos” as well as “more unconstrained photos” including
“webcam images . . . photojournalism and amateur photographer photos . . . and faces
cropped from surveillance-style video clips”). For a discussion of probe photos coming
from police body cameras, see generally JENNIFER LYNCH, FACE OFF: LAW ENFORCEMENT
USE OF FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 4–6 (2020). A probe photo can even be based on
a lookalike. See Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed
Data, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (May 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com
[https://perma.cc/NQA9-8DUK] (describing the use of a web image of Woody Harrelson as a probe photo when the detective thought the suspect resembled Harrelson).
14. See The Complete Guide to Facial Recognition Technology, supra note 11.
15. Id.
16. NELSON, supra note 10, at 39.
17. See id. (“The extracted features are compared against the stored [database]
templates to generate match scores . . . .”); Van Noorden, supra note 3.
18. See NELSON, supra note 10, at 38; see also SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, FACE FACTS: DISPELLING COMMON MYTHS ASSOCIATED WITH FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY 2, https://
www.securityindustry.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/facial-recognition-20193
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TD2-WKJ9].
19. NELSON, supra note 10, at 39; see also SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 18.
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The rate at which facial recognition systems are able to accurately match a probe photo to a database photo is rapidly improving
through the use of artificial neural networks, also known as machine
learning.20 These networks are self-improving; the more photos they
are able to access, and the more times they go through the matching
process, the more accurate they become.21
Despite these improvements, facial recognition is still an imperfect technology—it can falsely identify a person who should have been
accepted (“false acceptance”) or reject a person who should have been
identified (“false rejection”).22 Of particular concern, facial recognition
is more likely to misidentify minorities23 and women.24 For example,
in 2018, Amazon’s Rekognition25 incorrectly identified twenty-eight
members of the United States Congress as other people who had previously been arrested for a crime.26 The incorrect matches were
20. See Oleksii Kharkovyna, An Intro to Deep Learning for Face Recognition, ME26, 2019), https://towardsdatascience.com/an-intro-to-deep-learning-for
-face-recognition-aa8dfbbc51fb [https://perma.cc/FJ8X-2SQZ] (explaining deep
learning and how it is used by facial recognition); see also GROTHER ET AL., supra note
13 (“The major result of the evaluation is that massive gains in accuracy have been
achieved in the last five years (2013–2018) and these far exceed improvements made
in the prior period (2010–2013).”).
21. See Kharkovyna, supra note 20.
22. See NELSON, supra note 10, at 40–41.
23. See Natasha Singer & Cade Metz, Many Facial-Recognition Systems Are Biased,
Says U.S. Study, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/
technology/facial-recognition-bias.html [https://perma.cc/3DGX-T4AN]; see also
Garvie, supra note 13 (describing general biases in facial recognition).
24. This is largely attributable to the fact that these populations are underrepresented in photo databases. See Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. OF MACH.
LEARNING RSCH. 1–15 (2018).
25. Amazon advertises its Rekognition software as “provid[ing] highly accurate
facial analysis and facial search capabilities that you can use to detect, analyze, and
compare faces for a wide variety of user verification, people counting, and public safety
use cases.” See Amazon Rekognition, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/rekognition
[https://perma.cc/9LSA-MFCR]. Its customers include the NFL, CBS, and National Geographic. Id. Amazon has faced criticism and pressure from investors over its role in
the facial recognition market. See Natasha Singer, Amazon Faces Investor Pressure over
Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/
20/technology/amazon-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/53C7-5WNX]. In
June 2020, Amazon placed a one-year moratorium on police use of its Rekognition software. See Karen Weise & Natasha Singer, Amazon Pauses Police Use of Its Facial Recognition Software, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/
technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html [https://perma.cc/HD7A
-TKVL].
26. Jacob Snow, Amazon’s Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress with Mugshots, ACLU (July 26, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/
DIUM (June
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disproportionately people of color.27 This problem underlies one of
the common critiques of facial recognition today—that it is not accurate enough to use in policing.28 Although databases are becoming
more representative and accuracy is improving,29 the concerns described throughout this Note are exacerbated for both minorities and
women. A full exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Note, but they are at the forefront of the broad concerns posed by facial recognition technology.
2. Types of Facial Recognition, Including Facial Identification and
Face Tracking
Facial recognition technology can be used in many different ways
by a broad range of actors in society.30 Professor Andrew Ferguson
defines the four main types of facial recognition used for law enforcement purposes as (1) face surveillance, (2) face identification, (3) face
tracking, and (4) face verification.31 “Face surveillance” refers to the
privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely
-matched-28 [https://perma.cc/V3U7-VVGX].
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Garvie, supra note 13; Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 24, at 2; Davide Castelvecchi, Is Facial Recognition Too Biased To Be Let Loose?, NATURE (Nov. 18,
2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03186-4 [https://perma.cc/
CDS2-5CT8]; Tawana Petty, Defending Black Lives Means Banning Facial Recognition,
WIRED (July 10, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/defending-black-lives-means
-banning-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/J2GG-768E].
29. See Castelvecchi, supra note 28 (describing “significant improvement” in facerecognition accuracy). IBM is working to create a more diverse database, and some
researchers allege that improved algorithms have accuracy rates for African Americans that are equal to that of Caucasians. See Krishnapriya K.S., Kushal Vangara, Michael C. King, Vítor Albiero & Kevin Bowyer, Characterizing the Variability in Face
Recognition Accuracy Relative to Race (Apr. 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://
arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1904/1904.07325.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX82-C2RC];
see also GROTHER ET AL., supra note 13.
30. See Sharon Nakar & Dov Greenbaum, Now You See Me. Now You Still Do: Facial
Recognition Technology and the Growing Lack of Privacy, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 88, 96
(2016) (describing “the many and broad uses” of facial recognition including “security,
commerce, social media, personal use, and even for religious purposes” (footnotes
omitted)). Note that, at the time of this writing, facial recognition surveillance has been
deployed around the world to track the spread of the novel coronavirus. See Natasha
Singer & Chloe Sang-Hun, As Coronavirus Surveillance Escalates, Personal Privacy Plummets, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/
technology/coronavirus-surveillance-tracking-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/U4GN
-MCU9]; Antoaneta Roussi, Resisting the Rise of Facial Recognition, NATURE (Nov. 18,
2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03188-2 [https://perma.cc/
X6M9-MFLB].
31. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1105, 1116–28 (2021). Note that face verification, which is generally
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generalized monitoring of a public space.32 Face identification
matches a particular person (individualized suspicion is present).33
Facial recognition tracking, or “face tracking,”34 combines the two—it
describes the practice of obtaining information about an individual’s
movements using aggregated data obtained via facial identification.35
There are basic similarities between tracking with CSLI and facial
recognition tracking. Just as cell phone providers can store information about a person’s location,36 facial recognition tracking could
enable law enforcement or third parties to track a person’s whereabouts based on where their face appears.37 The key distinction between facial recognition tracking and other uses of facial recognition
is the locational component—it is not simply identifying a person at
one point in time, but instead is identifying a person at multiple points
and aggregating those points to create a record of movements. This
tracking can be done in real-time (as one’s face appears in front of a
camera at various points) or retrospectively (by aggregating stored
images of captured movements).
In thinking about how facial recognition tracking works, it is
helpful to understand the concept of the “data life cycle.”38 Data is generated in myriad ways, from making a phone call to visiting a website
to crossing the path of a camera. Once generated, data can then be collected, stored, and analyzed.39 “Use” occurs when any action is taken

used to confirm that a person is who they say they are, is not relevant to the issues
discussed in this Note.
32. Id. at 113.
33. Id. at 117.
34. Throughout this Note, the terms “face tracking” and “facial recognition tracking” are used to refer to the use of facial recognition data to produce information about
that person’s movements.
35. Id. at 120.
36. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS. & SAMUELSON L. TECH. & PUB. POL’Y CLINIC AT
U.C. BERKELEY, CELL PHONE LOCATION TRACKING (2016), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/
wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2016-06-07_Cell-Tracking-Primer_Final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/5WVX-JPZV].
37. See Jens-Martin Loebel, Is Privacy Dead?—An Inquiry into GPS-Based Geolocation and Facial Recognition Systems, IFIP INT’L CONF. ON HUM. CHOICE & COMPUTS. 338,
343 (2012) (describing the mechanics of how facial recognition and GPS location systems can be used together). A service that allows employers to use facial recognition
to track the location and movements of its employees is already being advertised. See
FINDD, https://www.findd.io [https://perma.cc/8AZR-C2R5].
38. See WILLIAM MCGEVERAN, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LAW 325 (2016) (describing the “life cycle of data” consisting of collection, processing and use, storage, and
disclosures).
39. Id.
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using the collected data, including a query of the data.40 In the case of
facial recognition tracking, data is collected when a camera captures
and stores a person’s image. It is used for facial recognition tracking
when those points are aggregated and viewed by a human operator.
That use can occur immediately following collection or at a later date.
Facial recognition tracking can reveal an individual’s movements
and thus a great deal of information about them.41 For this reason, facial recognition tracking is a tremendously powerful surveillance tool,
particularly in the hands of law enforcement. There are two key components necessary for facial recognition tracking to move from theory
to reality: extensive networks of cameras and databases of faces. The
next Section describes how each of these elements are rapidly developing, providing the tools necessary for facial recognition tracking to
become widespread in the near future.
B. CAMERA-FILLED CITIES AND BILLION-PERSON DATABASES: AN AMERICAN
DRAGNET
This Section describes the rapid growth of a facial recognitionpowered surveillance apparatus in the United States. It begins by
providing an overview of the cities and police departments that have
been most active in deploying sophisticated networks of cameras. It
then turns to the databases that are necessary for this system to be
effective. This apparatus is already being used by law enforcement to
identify suspects and investigate leads.42 As it continues to grow and
the scope of surveillance expands, the aggregation of location data will
enable the creation of records of a person’s physical movements.
1. Facial Recognition-Enabled Camera Networks Around the United
States
A 2019 Georgetown Center on Privacy and Technology report describes a rapidly developing surveillance system in the United
40. See Rebecca Lipman, Protecting Privacy with Fourth Amendment Use Restrictions, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 412, 413 (2018).
41. See Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553, 626 (2016) (“[T]he insight provided by [location data] into individuals’ lives is profound.”).
42. See Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial Recognition, and
Where It Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/
12/technology/facial-recognition-police.html [https://perma.cc/JKR6-GQ6S]; Alex
Hern, What Is Facial Recognition – and How Do Police Use It?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 24, 2020,
9:39 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/24/what-is-facial
-recognition-and-how-do-police-use-it [https://perma.cc/BBT5-EFLH] (discussing
police capability to track and pinpoint individuals using facial recognition technology).
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States.43 The report focuses on the surveillance practices of Detroit
and Chicago, noting that similar systems are developing in New York
City, Orlando, and Washington, DC.44 These systems as they exist today are comprised of extensive networks of cameras equipped with
facial recognition45 and massive databases powered by the public and
private sectors.46
In 2017, the city of Detroit entered into a three-year contract to
license a real-time video surveillance system equipped with facial
recognition technology.47 This system “provides continuous screening
and monitoring of live video streams” throughout the city.48 Detroit is
able to implement an advanced face surveillance system in part because of Project Green Light, a partnership between the city and local
businesses that began in 2016.49 The program, which installed more
than five hundred high-definition cameras throughout Detroit, was initially confined to businesses open late at night, but has expanded in
recent years into other businesses as well as community centers.50
Many of these cameras are now equipped with facial recognition
43. See generally Clare Garvie & Laura M. Moy, America Under Watch, GEO. L. CTR.
PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.americaunderwatch.com [https://
perma.cc/W79E-WVJ6] (describing the state of facial recognition surveillance in
American cities).
44. See id.
45. Although facial recognition technology can be applied to an image captured
by any camera, cameras equipped with facial recognition allow for real-time use. See
Jon Schuppe, Facial Recognition Gives Police a Powerful New Tracking Tool. It’s Also
Raising Alarms., NBC NEWS (July 30, 2018, 3:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
news/us-news/facial-recognition-gives-police-powerful-new-tracking-tool-it-s
-n894936 [https://perma.cc/W4HT-LFB4] (describing the advancement of real-time
facial recognition systems); Ava Kofman, Real-Time Face Recognition Threatens To
Turn Cops’ Body Cameras into Surveillance Machines, INTERCEPT (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://theintercept.com/2017/03/22/real-time-face-recognition-threatens-to-turn
-cops-body-cameras-into-surveillance-machines [https://perma.cc/T2SH-XF3F]
(same).
46. See Gregory Barber & Tom Simonite, Some US Cities Are Moving into Real-Time
Facial Surveillance, WIRED (May 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/
some-us-cities-moving-real-time-facial-surveillance [https://perma.cc/T4DL-CST4].
47. Garvie & Moy, supra note 43 (citing CITY OF DETROIT, CONTRACT NO. 6000801,
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES CONTRACT BETWEEN CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN AND DATAWORKS
PLUS (2017)).
48. Id.
49. See Juleyka Lantigua-Wlliams, Using a Green Light To Bring Crime to a Stop,
ATLANTIC (May 19, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/
project-green-light/483300 [https://perma.cc/X8JU-MBSC] (describing Project Green
Light initiative where business owners paid to have surveillance cameras that are
monitored by police installed at their business).
50. See id.; Garvie & Moy, supra note 43.
ON
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capability.51 That capability may soon be attached to police officers
and drones as well—the Detroit Police Department’s stated policy is
that it “may connect the face recognition system to any interface that
performs live video, including cameras, drone footage, and body-worn
cameras.”52 Despite its implications for surveillance in the city, the
adoption of facial recognition does not appear to have been subjected
to any public discussion. The Detroit Police Department has downplayed its significance and the program is not mentioned on the Project Green Light webpage.53
Detroit is just one example; there are many more. Chicago, which
is equipped with more than twenty thousand cameras, has also been
at the forefront of implementing facial recognition technology into policing, first applying for a grant from the Department of Homeland Security in 2009.54 Orlando pulled plans for a facial recognition system
after it was the subject of widespread public backlash.55 New York City
has had a facial recognition system in place since 2011 and has plans
to install facial recognition cameras at bridges and tunnels.56 The city
51. Garvie & Moy, supra note 43.
52. Id. (quoting CRIME INTEL. UNIT, DETROIT POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE § 8: FACIAL RECOGNITION (2019)).
53. George Hunter, Project Green Light To Add Facial Recognition Software, DET.
NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017, 11:52 AM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/
detroit-city/2017/10/30/detroit-police-facial-recognition-software/107166498
[https://perma.cc/W24J-NZJL] (“‘This isn’t some super-secret piece of technology,’
[Assistant Police Chief James] White said.”); Project Green Light Detroit, CITY DET.,
https://detroitmi.gov/departments/police-department/project-green-light-detroit
[https://perma.cc/G7V5-XVLK] (omitting any mention of facial recognition).
54. Garvie & Moy, supra note 43. Since 2016, Chicago has had a contract in place
with DataWorksPlus that allows it to monitor these cameras using real-time facial
recognition. See id. In November 2016, the Chicago Police Department responded to an
ACLU request by stating that it “does not use facial recognition technology in real-time
situations.” Id. (citing Letter from Charise Valente, Gen. Couns., Chi. Police Dep’t, to Karen Sheley, Dir., Police Pracs. Project, Roger Baldwin Found. of ACLU, Inc. (Nov. 10,
2016) (on file with author)).
55. See Facial Recognition Pilot Program, CITY ORLANDO, https://www.orlando
.gov/Initiatives/Facial-Recognition-Pilot-Program [https://perma.cc/U3AU-M4GQ]
(announcing that Orlando ended its pilot facial recognition program); see also Davey
Alba, With No Laws To Guide It, Here’s How Orlando Is Using Amazon’s Facial Recognition Technology, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/daveyalba/amazon-facial-recognition-orlando-police-department [https://
perma.cc/Z8C5-FW2Q] (describing Orlando’s use of facial recognition technology).
56. See Joseph Goldstein & Ali Watkins, She Was Arrested at 14. Then Her Photo
Went to a Facial Recognition Database, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/08/01/nyregion/nypd-facial-recognition-children-teenagers.html
[https://perma.cc/FXM6-RW2E] (noting that New York City has had some version of
facial recognition in place since 2011). The state of New York has already attempted to
use facial recognition to identify motorists, and though that program failed, the state
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installed a vast network of cameras as part of its “Domain Awareness
System,” which gives police warrantless access to footage for up to
thirty days.57 In 2018 Washington, D.C., itself equipped with a vast network of cameras, began experimenting with facial recognition security systems at the White House and other federal buildings.58 In 2015,
the Baltimore Police Department used a facial recognition program
called Geofeedia to identify protesters based on their social media
profiles.59 In May 2020, as protests unfolded in Minneapolis following
the death of George Floyd, BuzzFeed News reported that the Minneapolis Police had contracted with Clearview to employ the use of facial
recognition technology.60 This list could continue on; a search for local
governments employing facial recognition reveals that this is happening all over America, in small towns as well as large cities.61
In addition to these networks of fixed cameras, some police departments around the country are experimenting with the possibility
of body-worn cameras equipped with facial recognition technology.62
has plans to try again. See Paul Berger, MTA’s Initial Foray into Facial Recognition at
High Speed Is a Bust, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/mtas-initial-foray-into-facial-recognition-at-high-speed-is-a-bust
-11554642000 [https://perma.cc/9EJB-MWZ2].
57. See Chris Francescani, NYPD Expands Surveillance Net To Fight Crime as Well
as Terrorism, REUTERS (June 21, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-ny
-surveillance/nypd-expands-surveillance-net-to-fight-crime-as-well-as-terrorism
-idINL2N0EV0D220130621 [https://perma.cc/FBZ6-Y54C].
58. See Jon Schuppe, Secret Service Tests Facial Recognition Surveillance System
Outside the White House, NBC NEWS (Dec. 4, 2018, 11:43 AM), https://www.nbcnews
.com/news/us-news/secret-service-tests-facial-recognition-surveillance-system
-outside-white-house-n943536 [https://perma.cc/5ART-2U2T] (describing the White
House’s testing of facial recognition technology).
59. See Letter from ACLU to U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Oct. 18, 2016) (asserting that an
ACLU investigation found that Baltimore PD had used facial recognition to monitor
protestors in the riots following Freddie Gray’s death); see also GEOFEEDIA, BALTIMORE
COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT AND GEOFEEDIA PARTNER TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC DURING
FREDDIE GRAY RIOTS, https://congress.gov/116/meeting/house/109521/documents/
HHRG-116-GO00-20190522-SD012.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GW5-8J5H] (promotional
document advertising that its facial recognition services were used by Baltimore PD
following Freddie Gray’s death).
60. See Caroline Haskins & Ryan Mac, Here Are the Minneapolis Police’s Tools To
Identify Protesters, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 29, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/carolinehaskins1/george-floyd-protests-surveillance-technology [https://
perma.cc/SY2X-ESMB].
61. For a dynamic, interactive map showing the use of facial recognition surveillance throughout the country, see BAN FACIAL RECOGNITION, https://www
.banfacialrecognition.com/map [https://perma.cc/T77S-8VM7] (showing that law enforcement’s use of facial recognition is widespread).
62. See Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard, UPTURN (Nov. 2017),
https://www.bwcscorecard.org [https://perma.cc/69ES-WL2P] (listing police
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A full consideration of the benefits and drawbacks of body-worn cameras as a policy matter is beyond the scope of this Note.63 But the possibility of equipping these cameras with facial recognition technology
adds a further dimension to the potential of the surveillance apparatus discussed here.64
This omnipresent network of cameras may seem chilling in its
own right, but it is only a part of this story. The second part, discussed
next, is the rise of massive databases that provide the identifying data
necessary to turn a face into a name.
2. From Mugshots to Facebook: You’re Probably in a Database
Once a facial recognition system has created a template and algorithmic representation of a person’s face, it needs something to match
that template to.65 This is where databases enter the equation. There
is no shortage of such databases in America.66
Each of the cities described above uses databases as part of the
facial recognition process. In Detroit, the program is authorized to
departments that have adopted body cameras). In October 2019, California passed the
Body Camera Accountability Act (AB 1215), banning the use of facial recognition technology in police-worn body cameras for three years. See Bryan Anderson, New Law
Bans California Cops from Using Facial Recognition Tech on Body Cameras, SACRAMENTO
BEE (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol
-alert/article235940507.html [https://perma.cc/JYY4-BQFD]; Breaking: California
Senate Passes AB 1215, Blocking Face Recognition on Police Body Cameras, MEDIAJUSTICE
(Sept. 11, 2019), https://mediajustice.org/news/breaking-california-senate-passes
-ab-1215-blocking-face-recognition-on-police-body-cameras [https://perma.cc/
SH5N-KD36].
63. For a consideration of the privacy implications of police worn body cameras,
see generally Kelly Freund, Note, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy Implications of
Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91 (2015).
64. See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (and
What They Might Say About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933 (2016) (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of police worn body cameras with a particular emphasis on their potential for creating a retrospective record); Katelyn Ringrose, Law Enforcement’s Pairing of Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn
Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns, 105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 57 (2019).
65. See Hamann & Smith, supra note 9, at 10 (describing how such matches are
made).
66. See Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle, The Perpetual Line-Up:
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (Oct. 18,
2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org [https://perma.cc/8R36-HCV5] (describing
the various types of databases used in conjunction with facial recognition); Cade Metz,
Facial Recognition Tech Is Growing Stronger, Thanks to Your Face, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/13/technology/databases-faces-facial
-recognition-technology.html [https://perma.cc/LMG2-5LZB] (describing growth of
databases).
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search the city’s database of 500,000 mug shot photos as well as Michigan’s Statewide Network of Agency Photos, which includes driver’s
license photos.67 Chicago uses its database of seven million mug
shots.68 In August 2019, the New York Times reported that the New
York City Police Department had loaded “thousands of arrest photos
of children and teenagers into a facial recognition database” and used
those photos to make arrests years later.69
Through the FBI, the federal government maintains its own photograph database: the Next Generation Interface-Interstate Photo System (NGI-IPS).70 The Interstate Photo System (IPS) is the portion of
that database that contains photos searchable by facial recognition
technology.71 Local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies
are all authorized to use the NGI-IPS.72 Searchable photos include
those submitted by both criminal and civil authorities—in 2015 criminal and non-criminal data were linked together as part of a “one-identity system.”73
67. Garvie & Moy, supra note 43, at 1.A (“An Expensive, Expandable Face Surveillance System”).
68. Id. at 2.
69. Goldstein & Watkins, supra note 56.
70. The NGI-IPS is one part of the broader Next Generation Identification system
(NGI) that includes other types of biometric data, like iris scans and fingerprints, which
may have been collected as part of an arrest or for non-criminal reasons (e.g., state
licenses requirements). Each biometric identifier (photo) is linked to personal information. LYNCH, supra note 13, at 13. Since 2010, the FBI has been replacing the previous
system, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) with the
NGI. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-579T, FACE RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: DOJ
AND FBI HAVE TAKEN SOME ACTIONS TO ENSURE PRIVACY AND ACCURACY, BUT ADDITIONAL
WORK REMAINS 2 (2019). In 2017, the FBI issued a rule exempting the NGI system from
the Privacy Act. Privacy Act of 1974; Implementation, 82 Fed. Reg. 35,651, 35,651 (Aug.
1, 2017) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 16) (exempting NGI from the Privacy Act “to avoid
interference with the Department[ of Justice]’s law enforcement and national security
functions and responsibilities of the FBI”).
71. LYNCH, supra note 13, at 13.
72. Id. at 2. When using the NGI-IPS, a local, state, or federal agency submits a
probe photo obtained during an investigation. The FBI then uses an automated facial
recognition process to compare the probe photo against the NGI-IPS system. The system returns a gallery of two to fifty individuals whose photos are routed back to the
requesting agency. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 70, at 3. Note that the
NGI-IPS also allows text-based searching based on demographics including race. ERNEST J. BABCOCK, FBI, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION
(NGI) INTERSTATE PHOTO SYSTEM 2 (2015).
73. See BABCOCK, supra note 72, at 3 (explaining the process by which civil photos
may be connected to the Criminal Identity Group for searching); Christopher De Lillo,
Note, Open Face: Striking the Balance Between Privacy and Security with the FBI’s Next
Generation Identification System, 41 J. LEGIS. 264, 275 (2014–2015) (“The NGI expands
the data by allowing more mug shot photos per profile, photo and biometric data from
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Facial recognition databases are not limited to the formal, relatively regulated sphere of government agencies, however. In January
2020, the New York Times reported that Clearview, a private company,
had built a database of more than three billion photos it obtained from
scraping images posted on Facebook, Instagram, and other social media websites, in apparent violation of the terms of service of each of
the host sites.74 This is merely the latest iteration of an ongoing
theme—facial recognition vendors have long sought to improve their
algorithms by feeding them large collections of photos.75 Facebook,
which at one point claimed to possess the world’s largest facial recognition dataset,76 was recently sued by a class of persons in Illinois who
claimed that its storage of their facial data violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act.77 The size, scope, and sources of these
databases suggests that if you own a driver’s license, passport, or have
posted your picture on the Internet, you’re probably in a database,
whether you like it (or even know it) or not.
This vast network of cameras and matching photo databases suggests that the United States is rapidly moving towards a society where
merely appearing in public could mean being recorded, identified, and
civil submissions, facial features for use in FRT searches, and photos of scars and tattoos.”).
74. Hill, supra note 5.
75. See Olivia Solon, Facial Recognition’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Millions of Online Photos Scraped Without Consent, NBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www
.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/facial-recognition-s-dirty-little-secret-millions-online
-photos-scraped-n981921 [https://perma.cc/9F3M-HQ2F] (describing the popular
practice of facial recognition researchers and proprietors of using publicly available
photos from various online sites to refine facial recognition algorithms).
76. See Natasha Singer, Facebook’s Push for Facial Recognition Prompts Privacy
Alarms, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/
technology/facebook-facial-recognition-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/5RZM-UY8J]
(noting the Facebook researchers’ work was on “the largest facial dataset to-date”
(quoting YANIV TAIGMAN, MING YANG & MARC’AURELIO RANZATO, DEEPFACE: CLOSING THE
GAP TO HUMAN-LEVEL PERFORMANCE IN FACE VERIFICATION 1 (2014))).
77. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2019); Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th
Cir. 2019). The Ninth Circuit held that the class had standing to sue Facebook. Id. at
1272–73 (“In its recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized that advances in technology can increase the potential for unreasonable intrusions into personal privacy. . . . [W]e conclude that an invasion of an individual’s biometric privacy rights ‘has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been
regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.’” (quoting
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 1363 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016))). Following this ruling, Facebook
settled with the class for $550 million. See Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook To
Pay $550 Million To Settle Facial Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/technology/facebook-privacy-lawsuit-earnings
.html [https://perma.cc/3YXL-TVGP].
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tracked. This looming surveillance dragnet poses a significant threat
to the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable government searches. With this in mind, the next Section provides an overview of how the modern Supreme Court has grappled with issues of
government surveillance and technology.
C. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE, USE RESTRICTIONS, AND THE
CARPENTER SHIFT
This Section describes how the Supreme Court’s approach to
searches under the Fourth Amendment has shifted in response to
changing technology. The first portion describes the traditional reasonable expectation of privacy test and its subsequent application to
various types of searches. Then, this Section discusses how the Court
has applied new methods of scrutiny to the use of sophisticated technologies. This Section ends with a discussion of the culmination of
these trends in the 2018 case Carpenter v. United States, where the
Court recognized a Fourth Amendment right to an expectation of privacy in the whole of one’s physical movements.78
1. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Supreme Court focuses its Fourth Amendment analysis first
on the issue of whether a search or seizure has occurred.79 If it determines that a search or seizure has not occurred, the Fourth Amendment does not apply and the analysis ends. Generally, the Court determines whether a search occurred through the use of the “reasonable
expectation of privacy” test.80
The “reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis is rooted in the
1967 case Katz v. United States, where the FBI used a recording device
to monitor Charles Katz’s conversations held in a telephone booth.81
Justice Harlan, writing in concurrence, set out a two-pronged analysis

78. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
79. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (describing the “antecedent question” of whether a search has occurred).
80. As established in the landmark case Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81. Id. at 348. FBI agents suspected that Charles Katz was involved in an illegal
gambling enterprise. Id. at 354. They knew that Katz regularly used a particular telephone booth, so they attached a recording device to the booth. Id. That device yielded
conversations where Katz communicated wagers, and the agents used those recordings against Katz at trial, where he was convicted. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court then
granted certiorari and reversed, finding that Katz’s Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated. Id. at 359.
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to determine whether a search occurred.82 The test outlines that “a
Fourth Amendment search occurs when the government violates a
subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.”83 The Court has fully adopted this reasoning into authoritative
law.84 Under this analysis, if the police violate a person’s expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, then a
search has occurred. The Court then turns to the question of whether
that search was “reasonable,” which generally means that it requires
a warrant.85
Significantly, the Katz test has traditionally provided very little
protection for activities that a person carries out in the public sphere.
Indeed, in Katz itself, the Court noted that “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office is not a subject
of Fourth Amendment protection.”86 The Court has applied this reasoning broadly.87
As technology evolved to allow new types of investigative methods, however, the Court began to question some of its earlier
82. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”).
83. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31–33.
84. See, e.g., id. at 33 (attributing this description to Justice Harlan’s “oft-quoted
concurrence”).
85. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“Although the
‘ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is “reasonableness,”’ our cases establish that warrantless searches are typically unreasonable . . . .”
(quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995))); Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 459–60 (2011) (discussing presumptive unreasonableness of warrantless searches and exceptions to the warrant requirement). There is a maze of exceptions and special cases where the warrant requirement does not apply. Though
these are beyond the scope of this Note, the tendency of the Court to avoid labeling
something a search as a way of avoiding the warrant requirement is discussed infra at
note 336.
86. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
87. In Cardwell v. Lewis, the Court held that a car traveling on public roads had no
expectation of privacy because it “travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.” 417 U.S. 584, 590 (1974). The Court extended
this reasoning in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986), where it upheld the use of an aerial mapping camera on grounds that it was merely an enhancement of the naked eye. In Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989), police flew a helicopter
over the defendant’s greenhouse and looked through missing roof panels to observe
his marijuana grow operation. Echoing the reasoning in Dow Chemical, the Court held
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy because the “police may see what
may be seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’” Id. at 449
(quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
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assumptions. In United States v. Knotts, it held that the monitoring of a
beeper placed in a container of chemicals leading police to the owner’s
rural cabin did not invade a legitimate expectation of privacy because
the vehicle traveled over public roads.88 The Court noted, however,
that the possibility of “dragnet-type law enforcement practices” in the
future may require a different constitutional analysis.89 In Dow Chemical v. United States, the Court acknowledged that police surveillance
with improved technology could represent an unreasonable search.90
This language was a harbinger of things to come, as the Court would
eventually be forced to confront highly sophisticated methods of surveillance that had moved from the realm of speculation to reality.
2. “Digital Is Different”—the Supreme Court Seeks To Modernize
the Fourth Amendment
As new technologies have expanded government surveillance
power, both scholars and courts have grappled with questions of
whether and how traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
should change. In recent years, as the Supreme Court has been confronted with digital technologies that have expanded police surveillance capabilities, it has responded by expanding the means through
which a Fourth Amendment search can occur.
The Supreme Court has indicated its goal of “preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”91 The struggle to maintain this balance has
been described as the “equilibrium-adjustment theory” of the Fourth
Amendment.92 As advances in surveillance technology have provided
88. 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place
to another.”).
89. Id. at 284 (“[I]f such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent
envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable.”).
90. Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 238 (“It may well be, as the Government concedes,
that surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”).
91. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
92. See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476 (2011). This understanding of the Fourth Amendment recognizes that the role of the Court is to adjust Fourth Amendment standards as
technology changes in order to maintain a relatively constant balance between the individual and the state. As the technology underpinning or inhibiting surveillance develops, judges must strike a balance. On the one hand, they fear that the unchecked
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law enforcement with novel ways of gathering information about
members of the public, the application of traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine to those practices has resulted in significant gaps in
constitutional protection.93
The concept of use restrictions was introduced in 1995 by Professor Harold Krent as an attempt to bridge one such gap between historical Fourth Amendment analyses and the constitutional issues
posed by modern technology.94 Use restrictions apply Fourth Amendment scrutiny to the way that data is used, even after it has been legally collected. Professor Krent argued that Fourth Amendment doctrine did not properly consider the reasonableness of how the
government used information after it had been lawfully seized, even
though such use implicated interests protected by the Fourth Amendment.95 At the time, Professor Krent noted that his argument was out
of touch with current doctrine, instead grounding his points in theoretical and historical bases.96 But today, Professor Krent’s ideas look
prescient, as a series of recent cases suggests that the Court is determined to adjust its Fourth Amendment doctrine to remain relevant in
the digital age.
The Court began to signal potential changes in its Fourth Amendment analysis for digital search methods in United States v. Jones,97
where it held that the use of a Global Positioning System (GPS) to track
a vehicle through public streets was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.98 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, sidestepped the underlying surveillance issues in the case by deciding for
expansion of government power will lead to a dystopian state. But they also fear that
too much limitation on government power will lead to anarchy. Equilibrium-adjustment is a “judicial instinct” to balance the competing concerns. Id. at 488.
93. See Donohue, supra note 41, at 612 (“Fourth Amendment doctrine has long
struggled with how to integrate new technologies into the private/public distinction.
Perhaps nowhere are its failings clearer than in the realm of location tracking.”). For a
broader description of the various technologies that have led to this erosion, see generally id. at 581–631.
94. See Krent, supra note 8, at 51 (“My thesis is that the reasonableness of a seizure extends to the uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and information even after a lawful seizure.”).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 51 n.14 (noting that the article does not directly address the Court’s
then current definition of seizure).
97. 565 U.S. 400 (2012); see also Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United
States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2012) (describing Jones as a “giant step into the modern age”).
98. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
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Jones under a property-rights theory of the Fourth Amendment, noting that the Katz “reasonable expectations” test did not encompass the
entirety of Fourth Amendment analysis.99 The majority emphasized
the importance of “assur[ing] preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.”100 Despite taking a property-based approach in deciding the
facts of the case, the Court signaled its awareness of the constitutional
problems posed by modern surveillance methods by noting: “It may
be that achieving the same result through electronic means, without
an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,
but the present case does not require us to answer that question.”101
Jones is a landmark Fourth Amendment case, however, because
of its two concurrences by Justices Sotomayor and Alito, which attempted to answer precisely such a question.102 These concurrences,
joined by a total of five members of the Court, established that a
“shadow majority” of the Court was concerned by growing surveillance capabilities and the inability of its traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to address them.103
Justice Sotomayor rejected Justice Scalia’s narrow focus on property rights.104 She noted that the GPS monitoring used in the case “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”105 The government
can continue to access this data, “alter[ing] the relationship between
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”106 Justice Sotomayor argued that these surveillance capabilities
should be accounted for in the reasonable expectation test and analysis, and that the proper question is “whether people reasonably expect
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner
99. Id. at 406 (“But we need not address the Government’s contentions, because
Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”).
100. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
101. Id. at 412.
102. Id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment).
103. See, e.g., Laura Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 506–08
(2012) (describing the five Justices joining the Alito and Sotomayor concurrences as
the “shadow majority”).
104. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 415 (citing People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
106. Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir.
2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
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that enables the government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”107 The concerns described in Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence comprise one of
the pillars of Carpenter, where the Court recognized that an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements.108
Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence where he highlighted
problems with the majority’s property-based analysis, calling it
“highly artificial.”109 He also noted that the reasonable expectation of
privacy test is imperfect and that technology can change society’s expectations.110 Justice Alito agreed that the “preservation of that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted” was the proper goal, but rejected the majority’s
theory that “any technical trespass that led to the gathering of evidence” constituted a search.111 This too foreshadowed an important
part of the Carpenter analysis.112 Justice Alito concluded with a discussion of the unique privacy problems presented by cell phones, a preview of problems the Court would confront directly just two years
later.113
In 2014, the shadow majority was joined by the rest of the court
in the unanimous decision Riley v. California.114 In Riley, the Court held
that a warrant was required for police to search information on the
cell phone of an individual who had been arrested.115 Applying a
107. Id.
108. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018). Some commentators
have argued that Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning in Jones was an application of the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (describing and criticizing the mosaic
theory).
109. Jones, 565 U.S. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
110. Id. at 427 (“But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.”).
111. Id. at 420.
112. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very
long period.” (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment))).
113. Jones, 565 U.S. at 428–29 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
115. Id. at 386. The Court noted that searches in the criminal context generally required a warrant, and in the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls
within a specific exception to the warrant requirement. Id. at 382. At issue in Riley was
whether one such exception, searches “incident to arrest,” should include searches of
cell phones. Id. at 385.
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reasonableness balancing test, the Court dismissed arguments that
such searches were necessary to protect officer safety or the destruction of evidence when compared with their intrusiveness into a person’s privacy interests.116
Chief Justice Roberts, who authored Riley, wholeheartedly embraced the notion that digital is different.117 He famously dismissed
the government’s efforts to analogize a comprehensive search of a cell
phone’s contacts to other permissible searches as “like saying a ride
on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the
moon.”118 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that cell phones deserved
unique protection because they contained the “privacies of life.”119
This meant that they were subject to special protection because the
point of the Fourth Amendment was to protect certain kinds of information from government access.120 Riley confirmed what Jones suggested—the Court was determined to breathe new life into its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to ensure its relevance in the digital age.
But the exact contours of the new doctrine were uncertain. The next
Subsection discusses the 2018 case Carpenter v. United States, where
some, but not all, of those questions were answered.
3. A New Approach—the Carpenter Shift
In 2018, the Court decided the landmark case Carpenter v. United
States.121 In that case, the Court held that the government conducts a
Fourth Amendment search when it “accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.”122 Carpenter has spawned a wealth of scholarship and debate.
Professor Orin Kerr calls the decision “a blockbuster for the Digital
Fourth Amendment” that shows the Court is “on a new path.”123 Professor Paul Ohm writes that “Carpenter works a series of revolutions
in Fourth Amendment law, which are likely to guide the evolution of
116. Id. at 386–98.
117. See Henderson, supra note 64, at 951 (“So, while Riley perhaps left things unanswered that it could have addressed, it made very clear that when it comes to the
Fourth Amendment, digital is different.”).
118. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
119. Id. at 410 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
120. Id. (“The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection
for which the Founders fought.”).
121. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
122. Id. at 2211.
123. Orin S. Kerr, The Carpenter Shift, in THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3301257.
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constitutional privacy in this country for a generation or more.”124 To
be sure, Carpenter left many questions unanswered.125 But it signaled
that the Court has embraced new modes of analysis to ensure that the
Fourth Amendment remains relevant in the digital age.126
In Carpenter, cell-site location information (CSLI) was used to
place Timothy Carpenter at the scene of a series of robberies of electronics stores in Detroit.127 Based on tips from an accomplice, the
prosecutors in the case applied for two court orders under the Stored
Communications Act128 to obtain CSLI from Carpenter’s phone over a
four-month period in 2011, when the robberies occurred.129 Federal
magistrate judges granted these requests and ordered Carpenter’s cell
phone carriers to turn over his records, which they did.130 As a result
of these records, the government obtained 12,898 location points cataloging Carpenter’s movements.131
Carpenter moved to suppress the records on Fourth Amendment
grounds because they had been obtained without a warrant supported by probable cause.132 The district court denied the motion.133
At trial, the CSLI obtained from the records was used to place Carpenter at the scene of the crimes.134 Carpenter was convicted on nearly all
counts and sentenced to over one hundred years in prison.135 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.136

124. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 358
(2019).
125. As the Court itself noted, “we ‘do not begin to claim all the answers today.’”
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 n.4 (quoting id. at 2268 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)).
126. Id. at 2219 (“The Government’s position fails to contend with the seismic shifts
in digital technology that made possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location
but also everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.” (emphasis
added)).
127. Id. at 2212–13.
128. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2713. 18 U.S.C. § 2703 designates procedures law enforcement must follow to obtain user data from a third party.
129. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. Cell-site location information is produced when
cell phones continuously connect to nearby cell towers. Id. at 2211. The data is collected by cell phone providers for their own use. Id. at 2212.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2213.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed.137 The majority began by noting
that the “basic purpose of [the Fourth Amendment] is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials” and “property rights are not the sole measure of
Fourth Amendment violations.”138 It described two basic guideposts
for the Fourth Amendment: “First, that the Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’ Second, and relatedly, that a central aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance.’”139 The majority noted
the importance of these considerations in applying the Fourth Amendment to innovative surveillance methods and referenced Kyllo v.
United States and Riley v. California as examples of taking this approach.140
The majority noted that Carpenter sat at the intersection of two
lines of cases and began with the first: “a person’s expectation of privacy in his physical location and movements.”141 It described the holdings of Knotts and Jones and how they differed based on the scope of
surveillance at issue.142 The majority then described the second issue:
it has typically distinguished “between what a person keeps to himself
and what he shares with others.”143

137. Id. at 2223.
138. Id. at 2213 (first quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); and
then quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)).
139. Id. at 2214 (first quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); and
then quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
140. Id. In Kyllo, the Court held that the use of a thermal imaging device to detect
heat radiating from a person’s home was a search. 533 U.S. 27, 34–35 (2001). One
could argue that this case also was a part of the broader “digital is different” shift described in Part I.C.2, but its focus on the home as a unique source of Fourth Amendment
protection adds a degree of complexity that is unhelpful to the broader discussion here.
141. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215.
142. Id. (comparing “rudimentary tracking” in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276
(1983), with “more sophisticated surveillance”).
143. Id. at 2216. This is the third-party doctrine. See id. (“We have previously held
that ‘a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.’ That remains true ‘even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.’” (first quoting Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); and then quoting United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 443 (1976))). The third-party doctrine has been widely criticized as unjustly
limiting Fourth Amendment protection. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE
FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY 102–10 (2011) (arguing that defense of
the third-party doctrine boils down to arguing that there should be no Fourth Amendment protection for “digital dossiers”); Ohm, supra note 124, at 362 nn.32–33 (citing
criticisms of third-party doctrine).
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The Court noted that the challenge in front of it was “how to apply
the Fourth Amendment to a new phenomenon.”144 It declined to extend the third-party doctrine to cover CSLI, including direct government surveillance alongside third-party surveillance in the prohibition.145 The Court then held that “an individual maintains a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.”146 This expansion of the expectation of privacy to
the whole of one’s movements shows a willingness of the Court to adjust its traditional doctrine when applying the Fourth Amendment to
modern surveillance methods.
Carpenter signals a subtle but important shift in the theory underlying the Katz test. Carpenter leaves Katz intact—the reasonable
expectation of privacy concept remains a guiding principle in determining whether a search has occurred for Fourth Amendment purposes.147 But Carpenter expands the realm of what a person can reasonably expect to be private to include certain kinds of information.
Indeed, Carpenter suggests that the relevant question in determining
whether a Fourth Amendment search occurred can be whether the nature of the information at issue is itself protected from unwarranted
government scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.148 Whereas previously the test was about how the police interacted with physical
places and things (also known as “means analysis”),149 Carpenter asks
whether a technology or police practice is potentially so revealing that

144. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
145. Id. at 2217. This limitation of the third-party doctrine is significant in its own
right. Like Carpenter more broadly, its full implications remain to be seen. See Harvey
Gee, Last Call for the Third-Party Doctrine in the Digital Age After Carpenter?, 26 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 286, 288–89 (2020) (arguing that Carpenter should be understood as a
rebuke of the third-party doctrine).
146. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
147. See id. at 2214 n.1 (“Neither party has asked the Court to reconsider Katz in
this case.”).
148. Carpenter embraces the “informational security” theory of the Fourth Amendment. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 547, 604 (2017) (defining “informational security” as “personal information that
is secured in some manner from governmental intrusion”). Ferguson notes that the
theory of informational security is built on a broad array of scholarship from constitutional and privacy scholars. See id. at 605 nn.304–05 (describing informational security literature).
149. See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and
the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1343 (2002) (“[T]he
Court’s approach focuses on the means employed by government, and has been described by Melvin Gutterman as the ‘means model’ or what I choose to call ‘means analysis.’”).
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it violates a reasonable expectation in what the police can do.150 Rather than asking whether a government action violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a person’s tangible things, Carpenter asks
“whether a prior limit on government power has been lifted.”151 For
practical purposes, the problem in Carpenter was not how the police
obtained the CSLI records, but rather the nature of the records themselves.
The Court described three factors that should be considered to
determine whether a search has occurred based on the nature of the
data to be searched: (1) its “depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach”; (2) “the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection”;
and (3) its “deeply revealing nature.”152
The first factor “refers to the detail and precision of the information stored,” as well as its size and scope.153 Professor Kerr suggests that this factor implies that “records must be of a kind and nature that generally could not be collected in a pre-digital age.”154 This
factor continues the trend of recognition from the Roberts Court that
digital technologies are sufficiently different than their predecessors
to warrant a new approach.155

150. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19 (discussing how revealing CSLI data can
be and holding that by accessing Carpenter’s CSLI, the government invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy as to the entirety of his movements); Kerr, supra note 123, at 6 (“Carpenter signals a new kind of expectation of privacy test, one
that focuses on how much the government can learn about a person regardless of the
place or thing from which the information came.”).
151. Kerr, supra note 123, at 8.
152. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223; see Ohm, supra note 124, at 370. The discussion
here is based on Professor Ohm’s distillation of the factors but, as he notes, there is
likely to be some disagreement among scholars about how exactly these factors should
be defined. Id.; see, e.g., Kerr, supra note 123, at 16–26 (asserting that the Carpenter
factors are records created digitally, without meaningful voluntary choice, that reveal
“the privacies of life”). But note that these differences are relatively minor and do not
meaningfully change the assertions in this Note.
153. Ohm, supra note 124, at 372–76. Ohm defines depth as “the detail and precision of the information stored.” Id. at 372 (citing Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218). He defines breadth as referring to time, both in terms of collection frequency and storage
time. Id. Finally, he considers comprehensive reach as “the number of people tracked
in the database.” Id. at 373.
154. Kerr, supra note 123, at 16.
155. Ohm, supra note 124, at 399 (describing the majority’s “deep and abiding belief in the exceptional nature of the modern technological era”). Professor Ohm notes
Chief Justice Roberts’s emphasis on the sheer power, scale, and speed of modern technological changes. Id. at 401–03.
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The second factor “considers the extent to which the data subject
assumed the risk of revealing the information at issue.”156 The Carpenter majority quoted Riley, noting that cell phones are “‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable
to participation in modern society.”157 At its core, this factor asks
whether the records were “created without the subject’s meaningful
voluntary choice.”158
The third factor, which considers the “deeply revealing nature” of
a given set of information, suggests that some information deserves
inherent protection.159 This factor is an explicit extension of principles
described in Jones and Riley, that the “privacies of life” deserve special
protection from government access.160 This factor is the most revolutionary of the three because it considers the nature of the information
at issue rather than how it was obtained.161
Carpenter is also noteworthy because it specifically addressed
some of the Fourth Amendment problems that arise with the use of
sophisticated surveillance methods.162 The Court acknowledged that
“[a] majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements.”163 In other words, there is an important distinction between observing a person once versus chronicling their movements
over time.164 This has implications for surveillance by any method but
is particularly salient for comprehensive surveillance technologies
like facial recognition tracking.
The Court also noted that “[a] person does not surrender all
Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public
156. Id. at 376–78.
157. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385
(2014)).
158. Kerr, supra note 123, at 20.
159. Ohm, supra note 124, at 371–72.
160. Riley, 573 U.S. at 403 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)); see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 414–15 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
161. Ohm, supra note 124, at 372 (“[T]his factor focuses exclusively on an analysis
of the intrinsic nature of the information itself, divorced from any consideration of
what the police had to do to obtain it, the company’s incentives for gathering it, or what
the individual could have done to prevent it.”). Note that the exact contours of this factor remain unsettled, although this Note argues that location data should be considered per se deeply revealing. See infra Part III.
162. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–19.
163. Id. at 2217 (first citing Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); and then citing id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
164. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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sphere.”165 This statement casts serious doubt on the doctrine that
there is per se no reasonable expectation of privacy in public spaces.
At the very least, it affirms that law enforcement’s access to a piece of
data is not shielded from Fourth Amendment scrutiny solely because
it was collected in a public space.
It is true that in Carpenter the records at issue were possessed by
a third party, and the case was significant for its implications for the
third-party doctrine.166 But the Court noted that its reasoning applied
to direct government surveillance as well.167
In sum, during the last decade the Supreme Court has repeatedly
shown its willingness to apply practical standards to its Fourth
Amendment analysis to ensure that the capabilities of modern technologies do not eliminate Fourth Amendment protections. This Note
argues that to protect the Fourth Amendment principles recognized
in Carpenter, courts should analyze the use of facial recognition technology to track an individual’s movements as a search under the
Fourth Amendment.
II. COMPREHENSIVE FACIAL TRACKING FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERS
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE
This Part shows why facial recognition tracking is a threat to liberty and the Fourth Amendment. It begins by discussing the effects of
state surveillance on people and society and argue that the Fourth
Amendment is meant to protect individual liberty as well as privacy.
Then, this Part argues that modern constitutional oversight must consider the use of data as well as its collection in determining whether a
Fourth Amendment search occurred. It argues that facial recognition
tracking implicates the Fourth Amendment even if facial identification
does not. This Part concludes by arguing that law enforcement’s unbridled use of facial recognition tracking threatens the Fourth

165. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
166. Id. at 2220 (“We therefore decline to extend Smith and Miller to the collection
of CSLI. Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the
Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
167. Id. at 2217 (“Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, [this rule applies].”);
see also Ohm, supra note 124, at 392 (“Carpenter’s reasoning should apply even when
third parties are not involved. Its multi-factor test focuses most of its attention on the
quality of the database alone, so it should apply even to databases compiled directly
by the government.”).
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Amendment right to be free from “a too permeating police surveillance” and demands a constitutional response.168
A. THE EFFECTS OF POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND A CONSIDERATION OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT PURPOSE
In an effort to illustrate the potential ramifications of comprehensive police surveillance via facial recognition tracking, this Section
shows why surveillance is harmful and why considerations of liberty,
not just privacy, should be central to Fourth Amendment analysis.
1. Somebody’s Watching Me—the Harms of Surveillance
“Surveillance” is a broad term used to describe the general phenomenon of being watched.169 People generally do not like being
watched, and there is evidence that surveillance can affect behavior.170 Similarly, surveillance can be understood as limiting a person’s
choices and thus their freedom.171 Scholars such as Alan Westin have
described these effects as destroying the comfort that public spaces
can provide.172 Even the mere possibility of surveillance can affect
people. In his theory of the “panopticon,” the philosopher Jeremy Bentham argued that the knowledge that one might be under surveillance
can have the same effects as certainty that one is under surveillance.173 Surveillance can also lead to effects on behavior, including
168. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
169. Privacy scholar Professor Daniel Solove defines surveillance as “the watching,
listening to, or recording of an individual’s activities.” DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING
PRIVACY 104 (2009). Philosopher Helen Nissenbaum prefers the phrase “monitoring
and tracking” because she argues that surveillance implies a “set of political assumptions.” See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 22 (2010). This Note focuses on the
concept of surveillance of people, a phenomenon that is related to but distinct from
dataveillance, a term that describes the surveillance of information. See id. at 23.
Dataveillance is the subject of a broad scholarship and is beyond the scope of this Note.
See, e.g., id. at 23–25.
170. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK
AND POWER 344–45 (1988) (describing “anticipatory conformity,” the phenomenon of
people adjusting their behavior to preemptively conform to authority).
171. SOLOVE, supra note 169, at 30. This is philosopher Stanley Benn’s personhood
theory of privacy. Id. Solove describes how the theory has been adopted by the U.S.
Supreme Court in its right to privacy decisions including Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). Id.
172. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 31 (1967) (“Knowledge or fear that one
is under systematic observation in public places destroys the sense of relaxation and
freedom that men seek in open spaces and public arenas.”).
173. JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON; OR, THE INSPECTION-HOUSE 23 (1791). The panopticon is a prison made up of a ring of cells with a guard tower at its center. Id. at 5–
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self-censorship, conformity, and inhibition.174 Taken together, these
effects make surveillance a powerful tool for social control.175
Police surveillance can also be used in other undesirable ways.
For example, in Britain, surveillance has been used “to enforce social
conformity.”176 An investigative report of Britain’s surveillance system describes the use of a system of CCTVs to police loitering and public drunkenness rather than focusing solely on the types of violent
crimes one might envision when thinking about the potential benefits
of police surveillance.177 In other words, surveillance results in the policing of public spaces to keep out unwanted characters—something
far different than protection from violent crimes.178 This resembles
Foucault’s anticipation of modern society as a kind of “super panopticon” where constant surveillance acts to ensure conformity.179
Surveillance does not necessarily have to come from the state, but
its effects are more significant when it does. Surveillance by the state
6. The guard can see into the cells, but the prisoners cannot see into the tower. Id. The
prisoners know they may be under surveillance at any given moment, but they do not
know when. See id. at 23; see also Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 240 (2002). Although
the panopticon is generally described by its physical terms, it is interesting to note that
Bentham intended the panopticon as a broader political project with a focus on the
dynamics between members of a society. See Greg Elmer, Panopticon—Discipline—
Control, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES 22 (Kirstie Ball, Kevin D.
Haggerty & David Lyon eds., 2012). Michel Foucault expounded on Bentham’s idea
when he noted, “He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes
responsibility for the constraints of power . . . he becomes the principle of his own subjection.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 195–229 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
174. See Terence C. Burnham & Brian Hare, Engineering Human Cooperation, 18
HUM. NATURE 88, 99 (2007) (finding people altered their behavior when aware of an
image of a robot with human eyes); see also SOLOVE, supra note 169, at 108 (suggesting
that too much surveillance can adversely dampen human behavior); Neil M. Richards,
The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013) (“Such intellectual
surveillance is especially dangerous because it can cause people not to experiment
with new, controversial, or deviant ideas.”).
175. SOLOVE, supra note 169, at 108.
176. Slobogin, supra note 173, at 248 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchful State, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Oct. 7, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/28/magazine/l-a
-watchful-state-797944.html [https://perma.cc/V4GM-69Y4]).
177. Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchful State, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 7, 2001), https://www
.nytimes.com/2001/10/28/magazine/l-a-watchful-state-797944.html [https://
perma.cc/V4GM-69Y4]. “CCTVs” are closed-circuit televisions, a form of video surveillance. See id.
178. See Slobogin, supra note 173, at 248–49.
179. FOUCAULT, supra note 173; see also ZUBOFF, supra note 170, at 344–45 (suggesting that anticipatory conformity occurs when people accept that they are being
watched and adapt to it).
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is distinct from surveillance by some other entity, like a nosy neighbor,
for two main reasons. Most significantly, the state has the ability to
punish.180 Because people want to avoid punishment, they are more
careful in their interactions with the state than they otherwise might
be.181 As state surveillance capabilities increase, this unnaturally inhibited behavior comes to dominate more of one’s life.
Similarly but more subtly, the effects of surveillance are amplified
when a person believes not only that she is under observation, but
that her actions are susceptible to use by a bureaucracy.182 In other
words, people become more inhibited in their behaviors because they
are unsure of the range of potential consequences for those behaviors
in the hands of an institution as powerful and bureaucratic as the government. Technology scholar Bruce Schneier echoes these concerns in
his argument that “[u]biquitious surveillance means that anyone
could be convicted of lawbreaking, once the police set their minds to
it.”183 The idea of “perfect” enforcement of the law may sound superficially attractive, but it becomes less so as one considers its full implications.184
Governments have long sought to track and monitor the citizenry—both the concept of authority figures watching others and the
feeling that it is wrong have ancient roots.185 But the rise of modern
180. Bentham argued that surveillance was particularly pernicious when conducted by an authority with the ability to punish. See BENTHAM, supra note 173, at 29–
30; see also Slobogin, supra note 173, at 247.
181. See Elmer, supra note 173, at 25 (describing mechanics of “disciplinary society,” including coercion through surveillance).
182. See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1154
(2002) (describing a problem that occurs when people know information that is collected about them may be used in various, unknown ways by authorities); Daniel J.
Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN.
L. REV. 1137, 1189 (2002) (describing the threat posed by “inadvertence, carelessness,
and mindlessness of bureaucracy”) [hereinafter Solove, Access and Aggregation]; see
also Richards, supra note 174 (describing the chilling of civil liberties and an increase
in the power of the state as two distinct effects of state surveillance).
183. BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 92 (2015). See generally EMILY BAXTER, WE
ARE ALL CRIMINALS (2017) (arguing that virtually everyone has committed crimes over
the course of their lives).
184. Professor Woodrow Hartzog calls this the “suffocating restraint of the relentless, perfect enforcement of the law.” Woodrow Hartzog, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial
-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/
4TP6-5RGH].
185. See NELSON, supra note 10, at 28 (“For as long as there have been systems of
identification, there have also been persistent concerns regarding the consequences to
those individuals who are identified.”). Edward Higgs argues that the dynamics of mass
surveillance long predate industrial society, citing early English records such as the
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industrial societies and systems of government have changed the dynamics of surveillance practices.186 As smaller units of social organization have been replaced by massive governments and more efficient, industrialized systems, concerns about surveillance that were
once confined to person-to-person practices like “Peeping Toms” gave
way to the dystopian visions of Orwell’s 1984 and Huxley’s Brave New
World.187 This change was driven by the development of ever more
efficient surveillance systems.188 The development of panvasive surveillance technologies like facial recognition tracking is a continuation
of this trend.189 But while the steady erosion of individual liberty due
to surveillance technology may seem inevitable, it is not. The relationship between citizen and state is a legal, rather than technological, issue and is addressed directly in the Bill of Rights.
2. The Fourth Amendment Is a Limitation on Government Power
The founders of the United States were weary of an overly powerful government and embraced the concept of limited government to
protect individual liberty.190 This Subsection argues that the Fourth
Amendment should be understood not just as a protection of privacy
but as a protection of liberty alongside the rest of the Bill of Rights.
This context suggests that courts should be particularly sensitive to
surveillance systems that threaten individual liberty, like facial recognition tracking.
The Fourth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of Rights, is a limitation on government power in order to protect individual
Domesday Book of 1086 as attempts to organize and monitor the population. EDWARD
HIGGS, THE INFORMATION STATE IN ENGLAND 2–3 (2004). For a more contemporary overview, see SCHNEIER, supra note 183, at 62–77.
186. David Lyon, Kevin D. Haggerty & Kirstie Ball, Introducing Surveillance Studies,
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES, supra note 173, at 1; see also Toni
Weller, The Information State, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES, supra
note 173, at 58.
187. See SOLOVE, supra note 169, at 107, for a discussion of “Peeping Toms,” which
originated from a folktale dating back to 1050. For two twentieth-century narratives
of what a future totalitarian surveillance society could look like, see GEORGE ORWELL,
1984 (1949), and ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932).
188. See Weller, supra note 186.
189. “Panvasive surveillance” is a term coined by Professor Christopher Slobogin
to define surveillance technologies that are “pervasive, and are often invasive, [but]
their defining characteristic is their panvasiveness—the fact that they affect so many
people, most of them innocent of any wrongdoing.” See Christopher Slobogin,
Rehnquist and Panvasive Searches, 82 MISS. L.J. 307, 308 (2013).
190. Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181,
1265–66 (2016).
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liberties.191 In other words, the Fourth Amendment should be understood as pertaining to power, and scholars have argued that the
Court’s focus on privacy has diluted that purpose.192 There is support
for this assertion in the history of the Fourth Amendment: it was written as a response to general warrants during the colonial period,
which permitted their holder full discretion to search a person’s home
and effects.193 The Founders implemented the Amendment so that
there would be some check on government power to arbitrarily
search the citizenry.194
The Fourth Amendment should thus be understood as a protection of the people’s authority to determine how much the government
can learn about them.195 The focus on privacy in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has diluted this purpose because it fails to distinguish
between the government and private actors.196 Given the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, the permissiveness of state surveillance as a
constitutional matter should be understood as a distinct issue from
the privacy one may or may not enjoy from other members of the
191. Slobogin, supra note 97, at 11 (“The entire Bill of Rights, from the First
Amendment’s guarantees of speech and association through the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, is meant to protect liberty and dignity
against governmental abuse of power.”).
192. See, e.g., Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 303, 303–04 (2010) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment “seeks to protect the
political liberties of the sovereign ‘People’”); Ku, supra note 149, at 1326 (“The Fourth
Amendment protects power not privacy.”); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (asserting that the Fourth Amendment protects against “arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials”).
193. See Donohue, supra note 190 (describing the English and colonial background
in which the Fourth Amendment was developed); see also Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (detailing how the Fourth Amendment was historically
connected to property rights and physical intrusion); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS
142–44 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965) (stating that general warrants
violate “the freedom of one’s house”).
194. See Ku, supra note 149, at 1326 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment is about
power rather than privacy and describing its role as a bulwark against government
authority). Ku argues that the Fourth Amendment should be read alongside the rest of
the Constitution as a means of defining and limiting governmental power. Id. at 1337
(“[A] primary goal of the Fourth Amendment is the same as that of the entire Constitution—to define and limit governmental power.”).
195. See id. at 1326 (“[T]he amendment is best understood as a means of preserving the people’s authority over government—the people’s sovereign right to determine how and when government may intrude into the lives and influence the behavior
of its citizens.”).
196. Justice Black predicted this in his dissent in Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347,
374 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“The history of governments proves that it is dangerous to freedom to repose such powers [linking Fourth Amendment to ‘privacy’] in
courts.”).
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public.197 When a person on the street knows too much about you, it
can range from an annoyance to a potentially serious problem. When
law enforcement knows too much about you, it can put you in
prison.198
This is not to suggest that considerations of privacy should have
no role in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, it is to say that
the Fourth Amendment does not apply only to actions carried out in
private life.199 As the ability of law enforcement to surveil and record
public spaces increases, the reasoning that activities carried out in
those spaces are per se not Fourth Amendment searches makes less
and less sense.200
Traditional Fourth Amendment law has determined whether a
search occurred based on where and how the fruits of a search were
collected.201 This focus on the methods of collection, rather than the
use of the information itself, has diluted the effectiveness of the Fourth
Amendment as a limitation on government power. In the past, this
conflation of the collection and use of information was unimportant,
because there was little difference between the two. But as technology
has changed the methods and capabilities of surveillance, the flaws of
a singular focus on collection have become glaringly apparent.202

197. Ku, supra note 149, at 1369 (“[W]hether members of the public may invade
our privacy does not answer the question of whether government may.”). This approach also diminishes the strength of the argument that the government should be
able to freely surveil society because “privacy is dead.” See, e.g., Calvin C. Gotlieb, Privacy: A Concept Whose Time Has Come and Gone, in COMPUTERS, SURVEILLANCE, AND PRIVACY 156 (David Lyon & Elia Zureik eds., 1996) (arguing that people do not really value
privacy); Christopher Mims, Privacy Is Dead. Here’s What Comes Next, WALL ST. J. (May
6, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/privacy-is-dead-heres-what-comes
-next-1525608001 [https://perma.cc/YZ7T-LJGG].
198. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (“[T]he Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’ . . . [A] central aim of the Framers was ‘to place
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’” (first quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); and then quoting United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 595 (1948))); David Alan Sklansky, Too Much Information: How Not To Think
About Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1069, 1088 (2014) (arguing that lack of anonymity is a distinct issue from freedom from police surveillance).
199. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (“A person does not surrender all Fourth
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.”).
200. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing advancing surveillance
technology).
201. See SOLOVE, supra note 169, at 110 (describing Fourth Amendment doctrine’s
historical focus on where surveillance takes place); see also Slobogin, supra note 97, at
6 (describing the focus on property concepts in Fourth Amendment analysis).
202. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 41, at 613 (“Locational data, collected in bulk,
yields deep insight into individuals’ lives.”).
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B. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES CAN OCCUR AFTER DATA IS COLLECTED
This Section argues that Fourth Amendment searches can occur
throughout the data life cycle, including at the point of use as well as
the point of collection. Although Fourth Amendment scrutiny has typically focused on the collection stage, emergent technologies have allowed for data to be used in new ways that should also be considered
searches. Facial recognition tracking is one such use. Facial recognition tracking is distinct from facial identification, which is a use of data
that is unlikely to be considered a Fourth Amendment search. Because
facial recognition tracking aggregates multiple points of data about a
person to reveal information of a deeply revealing nature, it should be
considered a Fourth Amendment search, which courts can recognize
through employing use restrictions.
1. Searches Can Occur Throughout the Data Life Cycle
Recall that the “data life cycle” refers to the multiple points of the
process through which human operators interact with data.203 Traditionally, Fourth Amendment law (and data law more broadly)204 has
focused on the collection phase of the data cycle by limiting the ability
of law enforcement to collect information about a person.205 But as
bulk data collection has become easier and cheaper, the way that data
is used must also be scrutinized.
Historically, collection was limited by human senses.206 Collecting massive amounts of data was simply too costly to be a regular occurrence, as the Court emphasized in Carpenter.207 This meant that
203. See MCGEVERAN, supra note 38; supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
204. See MCGEVERAN, supra note 38, at 327–28.
205. See discussion supra Part I.C; see also supra note 87 (citing cases applying the
Katz test); Lipman, supra note 40, at 440 (“The Court’s Fourth Amendment doctrines
are currently built around regulating collection . . . [.]”).
206. See Orin S. Kerr, Use Restrictions and the Future of Surveillance Law, in THE
FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2011) (“In [the past], surveillance systems were simple.
The ‘system’ was really just a person. The person would listen or watch. If he saw
something notable, he would tell others about it.”).
207. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“[Employing traditional surveillance methods] ‘for any extended period of time was difficult and costly
and therefore rarely undertaken.’” (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429
(2014) (Alito, J., concurring))); see also Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making Cents out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE
L.J.F. 335, 341–50 (2014) (attempting to quantify the reduced costs in various methods
of surveillance); Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public
Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX.
L. REV. 1349, 1375 (2004) (“But one of the hallmarks of new surveillance technologies
is the degree to which they lower the costs, both in time and expense, of round-the-
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practical and logistical limitations served as effective protections of
Fourth Amendment rights. Additionally, there was not a meaningful
distinction between collection and use—the difficulty of collecting information served as an effective proxy for protecting the use of information, and once something was obtained by police, they were not
able to garner additional information from how they used it. Thus, the
use of information was more or less controlled by regulating its collection.208
Today, however, data can be collected in broad, sweeping ways
that are not subject to human or cost constraints.209 For example, the
NSA famously attempted to create a database of all phone calls made
on the Verizon network in its bulk metadata program.210 Indeed, it is
becoming increasingly possible to collect data on everyone, all the
time.211 That data can then be stored and accessed indefinitely, as well
as analyzed for further insights.212 The network of surveillance cameras described in Part I is another example of this type of data collection. With enough storage capacity, such a network could be used to
store the entirety of its recordings, which could then be accessed at
any time. Because this level of collection leads to enormous new surveillance capabilities, it also creates new Fourth Amendment liabilities.
The regulation of data collection, while important, does not fully
protect Fourth Amendment rights in the modern day.213 Collection
and use are distinct components of the modern surveillance process,
and each of these phases can raise Fourth Amendment concerns, as
scholars have recognized.214 The use of information threatens harms
clock monitoring.”). See generally Lipman, supra note 40 (describing how the limitations on how police can use evidence have changed).
208. As Professor Orin Kerr puts it: “The government cannot misuse evidence if it
does not have it in the first place.” Kerr, supra note 206, at 4.
209. See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 198, at 1085–87 (describing pervasiveness of
various forms of surveillance in modern society).
210. Henderson, supra note 64, at 940–44.
211. Id. at 935–36 (describing how “technology increasingly permits capture of almost all information”).
212. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1468
(2000) (explaining the distinction between technologies that enable data gathering
and the organization and analysis of that data).
213. See Donohue, supra note 41, at 628 (“[T]o the extent that the Fourth Amendment analysis hinges on an initial determination at the moment of collection, it does
not provide for a later interest to arise as the volume of information expands.”).
214. See Krent, supra note 8, at 51 (“[T]he reasonableness of a seizure extends to
the uses that law enforcement authorities make of property and information even after
lawful seizure.”); Kerr, supra note 206, at 4 (“There are now four basic stages of
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to Fourth Amendment protections that are distinct from those caused
by the collection of that information. Protecting the information itself
from government searches requires that a Fourth Amendment analysis be applied to its use. Indeed, in some cases, like facial recognition
tracking, the use of information may result in constitutional harm
even if the information was legally collected.
2. Facial Tracking Should Be Considered a Search Even If Facial
Identification Is Not
Recall that “facial identification” refers to the use of facial recognition technology to identify someone.215 This is distinct from facial
tracking, which uses multiple points of facial identification to chronicle a record of a person’s movements.216 Though some have argued
that facial identification should itself be considered a Fourth Amendment search, it is most likely sufficiently analogous to existing modes
of policing that have been found constitutional to not be considered a
search. However, because location aggregation is deeply revealing, facial recognition tracking raises Fourth Amendment harms that facial
identification does not. As a result, facial recognition tracking should
be considered a Fourth Amendment search.
a. Facial Identification Is Unlikely To Be Considered a Search
Rightfully recognizing the surveillance capabilities of facial
recognition technology, some scholars argue that facial identification
should be considered a Fourth Amendment search.217 However, this is
unlikely to be the case under current doctrine. First, the police do have
some right to surveil public spaces.218 While others have argued for a
computer-based surveillance systems: 1) data collection, 2) data manipulation by a
machine, 3) human disclosure, and 4) public disclosure.”).
215. See discussion supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
216. Id.
217. See, e.g., Mariko Hirose, Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology, 49 CONN. L. REV.
1591, 1595 (2017); Kimberly N. Brown, Anonymity, Faceprints, and the Constitution, 21
GEO. MASON L. REV. 409, 411 (2014); Elizabeth Snyder, Note, “Faceprints” and the Fourth
Amendment: How the FBI Uses Facial Recognition Technology To Conduct Unlawful
Searches, 68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 255, 257–58 (2018); Claudia Cuador, Comment, From
Street Photography to Face Recognition: Distinguishing Between the Right To Be Seen
and the Right To Be Recognized, 41 NOVA L. REV. 237, 240 (2017).
218. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly
exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”); 1 WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(g) (6th ed.
2020) (describing law allowing police to surveil public); see also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“No person can have a reasonable expectation that others
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right to anonymity under the Constitution,219 this is not consistent
with the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment or its modern jurisprudence.220 This likely remains true even following Carpenter;
while Carpenter shifts the Katz test, it is unlikely that Carpenter stands
for the proposition that the police cannot identify a person in public,
even through the use of sophisticated technology.221
Second, identifying a person at a single point is unlikely to yield
information of a “deeply revealing nature”222 that exposes the “privacies of life.”223 These problems arise through the aggregation of a person’s location at multiple points in time, not necessarily from any one
point. This is the “whole of their physical movements” that is protected in Carpenter.224 It is difficult to see how the identification of a
person, even with a substantially enhanced tool like facial recognition,
is sufficiently different from existing, constitutionally permissible police methods to constitute a Fourth Amendment search.225 As the Massachusetts Supreme Court observed in a 2020 case: “It is an entirely
ordinary experience to drive past a police officer in a cruiser

will not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his
face will be a mystery to the world.”); supra note 87 and accompanying text (presenting cases where police surveillance of public spaces was permitted). But see Elizabeth
E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35,
62–63 (2014) (arguing that the Court should reexamine its doctrine that the Fourth
Amendment does not provide protection in public areas). Note also that there may be
special circumstances or locations (such as a public protest, voting center, or other politically sensitive locations) where identification using facial recognition technology is
considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Julian R. Murphy,
Chilling: The Constitutional Implications of Body-Worn Cameras and Facial Recognition
Technology at Public Protests, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (2018). Further exploration of these ideas is beyond the scope of this Note.
219. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 217; Slobogin, supra note 173.
220. See Brown, supra note 217, at 417–20 (describing lack of anonymity at the
time of the American Revolution).
221. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
222. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
223. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
224. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
225. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (“Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed
upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them
in this case.”). But see State v. Muhammad, 451 P.3d 1060, 1071 (Wash. 2019) (demonstrating the argument that they are different in kind, not just degree, in finding that a
one-time “ping” of a cell phone to determine its location using CSLI was a search under
the Fourth Amendment).

2021]

SOMEBODY’S TRACKING ME

2481

observing traffic on the side of the road, and, of course, an officer may
read or write down a publicly displayed license plate number.”226
An application of these principles to an instance of real-life identification helps to illustrate the point. In 2017, police pulled a man
over following a high-speed chase but were unable to identify him.227
Officers took a photo of the man and used facial recognition to compare it to a large database, revealing his identity.228 Though this is the
type of comprehensive technology contemplated by Carpenter, and his
inclusion in the database may well have been involuntary, this type of
identification does not result in deeply revealing information. It is
analogous to identifying someone from memory or based on their fingerprints. As a result, this type of identification probably does not implicate the Fourth Amendment under the current doctrine.
Thus, this Note operates under the assumptions that the collection of facial recognition data and facial identification through the use
of that data are unlikely to be considered Fourth Amendment
searches. While a deeper exploration of the constitutional issues
posed by facial identification is beyond the scope of this Note, the appropriate solution to that problem is likely to be legislative rather than
judicial.229
b. Facial Recognition Tracking Should Be Considered a Search
Facial recognition tracking, however, reveals an additional layer
of information about a person. Because this information—a record of
a person’s movements—is deeply revealing, facial recognition
226. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 142 N.E.3d 1090, 1106 (Mass. 2020).
227. See Valentino-DeVries, supra note 42.
228. Id.
229. In a representative democracy, the appropriate forum for a comprehensive
determination of the role facial recognition should play in society is through the representatives of the people. Legislatures are politically accountable and thus more
suited to decide policy questions that require balancing trade-offs. They also are institutionally suited for fact-finding in a way that the courts are not. Article III requires
that the courts decide cases or controversies, meaning they are limited to the facts of
the case in front of them. This is a poor way to make broad policy. See, e.g., Facial Recognition Technology: (Part 1) Its Impact on Our Civil Rights and Liberties: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong. 5 (2019) (written testimony of Professor Andrew Guthrie Ferguson) [hereinafter Hearing]. Justice Alito has been the
leading voice on the Court for the position that comprehensive regulation should come
from the legislature. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Legislation
is much preferable to the development of an entirely new body of Fourth Amendment
caselaw for many reasons, including the enormous complexity of the subject, the need
to respond to rapidly changing technology, and the Fourth Amendment’s limited
scope.”).
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tracking should be considered a search. The primary reason that the
use of facial recognition tracking raises its own set of harms is due to
the phenomenon of aggregation—the aggregation of location data reveals additional information about the person.230 Various forms of
technology, including facial recognition, allow government entities to
legally collect vast troves of data which can then be stored for later
use and analysis.231 Once collected, this data can be aggregated. Because it can reveal trends and patterns, aggregated data allows for “a
qualitatively more complete picture of that individual to be drawn.”232
Professor Daniel Solove calls this the “aggregation problem.”233 The
aggregation of data yields additional information—the whole is
greater than the sum of its parts.234 This is the power of big data.
Facial recognition tracking is a means of learning information
about a person through the aggregation of data. It combines data
points of a person’s location based on the appearance of their face at
that location. Each point, in theory, could have been legally collected.
However, when the points are aggregated, the data provides a much
more complete picture of a person’s life.235 Identifying a person standing outside of an office building will reveal their name. But the aggregation of data showing them arriving at that building each morning
and leaving each night reveals additional information about them—
they probably work there. Aggregating data showing that person
230. See Donohue, supra note 41, at 626–27 (describing how location data provides “profound” insight into individuals’ private lives).
231. See Lipman, supra note 40, at 441 (“[A facial recognition camera network]
could allow law enforcement to search for any individual, anywhere in a city, going
back for weeks or months, depending on how much cheap data storage the city invested in.”); Blitz, supra note 207 (“But one of the hallmarks of new surveillance technologies is the degree to which they lower the costs, both in time and expense, of
round-the-clock monitoring.”).
232. See Ferguson, supra note 148, at 574–75.
233. See Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 182, at 1185 (“Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait about our personalities. The aggregation problem
arises from the fact that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily
amassed and combined.”).
234. See Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy,
88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2020); see also Kerr, supra note 206, at 8 (“[C]omputer surveillance and modern camera surveillance tend to work by gathering more information that is less invasive per datum, and then manipulating it through electronic
methods to yield important information that normally would be obtainable only
through more invasive surveillance techniques.”); Donohue, supra note 41, at 628
(“The value of aggregated information changes when there is more of it.”).
235. See Donohue, supra note 41 (“Locational tracking shows where you go, what
you do, and who you are with when you do so.”).
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leaving the office building and data showing them at a Planned
Parenthood, a synagogue, or a political event reveals even more information.
The Court has struggled with its response to the problems of data
aggregation.236 In Jones, it indicated awareness that it was addressing
a Fourth Amendment issue of a different nature than in previous
cases. Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence specifically noted that it was
aggregation that gave rise to the harms in that case.237 Recall Professor Krent’s 1995 argument that use restrictions were one such solution to this problem.238 Writing twenty-three years later, Rebecca Lipman argued that the Court has been moving towards use restrictions
doctrinally and should now do so explicitly.239
This Note sees Carpenter as signaling tacit agreement from the
Court.240 Rather than focusing solely on collection, which asks
whether the police properly obtained information, Carpenter broadened judicial scrutiny of what the police can do, holding that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in certain types of information.241 Thus, instead of constantly adjusting its collection-based
doctrine to advancing technology, the Court moved to impose protections on certain types of information itself—information that is
“deeply revealing.”242 This is the basis for the third Carpenter factor.
The exact point at which this occurs remains unclear,243 but the Court
236. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
237. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.” (emphasis
added)).
238. See Krent, supra note 8.
239. See generally Lipman, supra note 40 (arguing that the Court has considered
how law enforcement uses information in its Fourth Amendment analysis but has been
reluctant to say so openly). Lipman argues that a use restriction-based approach to the
Fourth Amendment is the most effective way to ensure its relevance going forward,
and that the Court should openly embrace such an approach.
240. Lipman mentions Carpenter but does not read it this way. She argues that it
was significant for the third-party doctrine but did not apply to direct government surveillance. See id. at 446. I disagree with Lipman based on both the text of Carpenter
itself as well as the interpretations of other scholars. See Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (“Whether the Government employs its own surveillance
technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that
an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy . . . .”); see also Ohm, supra
note 124.
241. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218–19; see also Kerr, supra note 123, at 6–7.
242. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
243. See infra Part III.A.2.
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has indicated its awareness that the use of data through aggregation
can pose constitutional concerns.
In embarking on this shift the Court continued the natural progression of the reasoning it had previously applied in Jones and Riley.244 Modern surveillance methods give police new tools and represent new threats to the Fourth Amendment.245 Digital technologies
can transform police practices because they are a paradigm shift.246
And people have some reasonable expectation of privacy in what the
government can learn about them, even in public.247 In a computerized age of vast digital libraries, protection of this right requires restrictions on how police can use data in addition to restrictions on how
they can collect it.
The surveillance apparatus described in Part I collects facial
recognition data which can then be aggregated and used by police.248
The collection of this data at any particular point is unlikely to be considered a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment under
current doctrine.249 But because the use of these aggregated data to
track a person present independent Fourth Amendment concerns,
that use should be analyzed as an independent search.250
Technological and political trends indicate that the United States
is rapidly moving towards a future where facial recognition tracking
systems can be accessed and used as a mass surveillance tool.251 The
next Section describes how these practices and intended practices are
indicative of the broader problem at issue: the Fourth Amendment
244. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.
373 (2014); supra Part I.B.2.
245. Jones, 565 U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing Fourth Amendment threats from novel forms of surveillance).
246. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393 (describing the assertion that searches of all data stored
on a cell phone is “materially indistinguishable” from searches of physical items “is like
saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon”).
247. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; cf. Riley, 573 U.S. at 400 (“[T]he fact that a
search in the predigital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does
not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital gallery.”).
248. See supra Part I.B; infra Part II.C.
249. See supra note 218 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (“No person can have a reasonable expectation that others will
not know the sound of his voice, any more than he can reasonably expect that his face
will be a mystery to the world.”).
250. See Lipman, supra note 40, at 456 (“[T]he Court should find that certain uses
are Fourth Amendment searches in their own right that can be analyzed for reasonableness independently of their antecedent collection.”).
251. See LAW ENF’T IMAGING TECH. TASK FORCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT FACIAL RECOGNITION USE CATALOG (2019) (describing current uses of facial recognition technology).
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right to be free from “too permeating a police surveillance” is violated
by the unregulated use of facial recognition tracking.252
C. UNBRIDLED USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TRACKING VIOLATES THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The growing facial recognition infrastructure and rapidly improving tracking capabilities described in Part I indicate that, in the
near future, law enforcement will be capable of freely tracing the
movements of every person in a systematic, computerized fashion.
Like CSLI, the aggregation of facial recognition data will enable
the creation of a comprehensive record capable of revealing the whole
of a person’s movements.253 But unlike with cell phones, which one
can choose not to use (or, in some cases, to turn off CSLI), a person
appearing in public does not have the option of not showing their
face.254 Once this system is in place, individual location data will be
accessible at will by law enforcement for a variety of purposes.255
Law enforcement agencies are likely to use such powers
broadly—in fact, they are already signaling their intention to do so.
For example, the Detroit Police Department includes in its facial
recognition policy that face recognition information is authorized to
“investigate and/or corroborate tips and leads.”256 This broad prerogative would enable officers to surveil a wide range of regular activity
with no warrant and no knowledge on the part of the person being
watched. The same document cites the Department’s right to “connect
the face recognition system to any interface that performs live video,
including cameras, drone footage, and body-worn cameras.”257

252. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
595 (1948)).
253. See Hern, supra note 42.
254. For an interesting report on the burgeoning business of providing people with
clothing that can elude facial recognition, see John Seabrook, Adversarial Man, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 16, 2020). However, facial recognition is improving in its ability to identify masked faces. See Face Recognition Software Shows Improvement in Recognizing
Masked Faces, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.nist.gov/
news-events/news/2020/12/face-recognition-software-shows-improvement
-recognizing-masked-faces [https://perma.cc/FFJ6-SKK9].
255. See Garvie et al., supra note 66 (describing how facial recognition can alter
policing methods).
256. See CRIME INTEL. UNIT, DETROIT POLICE DEP’T, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
§ 8: FACIAL RECOGNITION 8.2(c)(v) (2019).
257. Id. at 8.5(c).
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Federal agencies are also eager to make use of facial recognition
tracking.258 The FBI already uses facial recognition technology in active investigations259 and has also expressed its desire to use face
tracking to “track people’s movements to and from ‘critical events.’”260
Other federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement are also using facial recognition technology
in their operations.261 Although these operations appear to be currently limited to facial identification, there is no reason to believe that
they would not expand to include facial tracking in the future in the
absence of further legal protection.
Thus, pending federal legislation, it is likely that in many places
in the United States, law enforcement’s use of facial recognition to
identify people will soon be the norm. Given the rate at which facial
258. See KIMBERLY J. DEL GRECO, SEARCH ANNIVERSARY: THE NEXT 40 YEARS: FUTURE
TRENDS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 6 (2009) (describing FBI’s goal of using biometric data to
“[r]eveal movement patterns”).
259. The FBI does so through its Facial Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation
(FACE) Services Unit. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 70, at 3. FACE Services uses the NGI-IPS system as well as separate databases maintained by the State
Department and various state governments, which contain photos obtained for noncriminal purposes, including driver’s license and visa applicant photos. Id. In all, more
than 641 million photos were available to the FACE Services program as of 2018, including passport and driver’s license photos. See also Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State
Driver’s License Photos Are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition Searches, WASH. POST
(July 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbi-ice
-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches
[https://perma.cc/JB6Z-HNEN].
260. LYNCH, supra note 13, at 20 (citing RICHARD W. VORDER BRUEGGE, FBI, FACIAL
RECOGNITION AND IDENTIFICATION INITIATIVES 5 (2010)). For a comprehensive overview
of the FBI’s use of facial recognition as of 2012, see generally Donohue, supra note 103,
at 425–51.
261. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/TSA/PIA-046, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT
FOR THE TRAVEL DOCUMENT CHECKER AUTOMATION USING FACIAL RECOGNITION (2018),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy-pia-tsa-046
-tdcautomationusingfacialrecognition-january2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/EK6Q
-PS6F]; see also Bill Chappell, ICE Uses Facial Recognition To Sift State Driver’s License
Records, Researchers Say, NPR (July 8, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/
739491857/ice-uses-facial-recognition-to-sift-state-drivers-license-records
-researchers-sa [https://perma.cc/4ADW-P88Z]; Catie Edmonson, ICE Used Facial
Recognition To Mine State Driver’s License Databases, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licenses-facial-recognition
.html [https://perma.cc/B26P-XF4N]; Jon Porter, US Facial Recognition Will Cover 97
Percent of Departing Airline Passengers Within Four Years, VERGE (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/18/18484581/us-airport-facial-recognition
-departing-flights-biometric-exit [https://perma.cc/M9ZT-GPCZ] (reporting that the
Department of Homeland Security has said that it plans to use facial recognition on
97% of airline passengers by 2022).
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recognition technology is advancing, it is also likely that today’s capabilities represent only the tip of a surveillance iceberg. It will soon be
possible to query a person’s name against a database containing records of the movements of full populations, giving the user the ability
to build a profile of a person based on their movements.262 Such capabilities give the user immense power over the movement, location,
and association of citizens.263 This is true for any user, but especially
the government.264
Facial recognition tracking (and other comprehensive surveillance methods) also creates wholly novel threats to security. As a surveillance apparatus matures, its focus shifts from the detection of
crime to its prevention, with a focus on “predicting future risky behaviors and/or people.”265 Such predictions could even be based on a person’s mental or emotional state rather than their actions.266 These
262. Hearing, supra note 229 (“One potential form of face surveillance is the ability
to search stored footage from networked surveillance cameras. . . . The resulting scans
could map the location of individuals at any point they are identified by a camera.”
(footnote omitted)).
263. See Hartzog, supra note 184; Garvie et al., supra note 66.
264. See infra Part II.B.
265. Ayse Ceyhan, Surveillance as Biopower, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES, supra note 173, at 43. This algorithmic approach is also known as
preemptive or predictive policing. For an excellent summary of the dangers of this
preemptive approach to policing, see generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF
BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017).
See also CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION 101–03 (2016) (arguing that
preemptive policing is reactive and diverts focus away from improving social problems). Chicago is already using algorithms to predict violent crimes. See John Buntin,
Social Media Transforms the Way Chicago Fights Gang Violence, GOV’T TECH. (Sept. 30,
2013), https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Social-Media-Transforms-the-Way
-Chicago-Fights-Gang-Violence.html [https://perma.cc/T3HX-CE4E]. Predictive policing has also been used in Rochester, Minnesota. See Maya Rao, Rochester Hopes Predictive Policing Can Steer Juveniles away from Crime, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 24, 2014), https://
www.startribune.com/rochester-police-plan-to-target-at-risk-teens-raises
-concerns/280385202 [https://perma.cc/P3XN-7NTU]. Aziz Huq argues that predictive policing exacerbates the racial imbalances in the criminal justice system. See Aziz
Z. Huq, Racial Inequality in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019). For
one pop-culture depiction of a world that employs predictive policing, see MINORITY
REPORT (20th Century Fox & Dreamworks Pictures 2002).
266. For example, Amazon Rekognition boasts its ability to not only identify individuals but also analyze their sentiments. See Ranju Das, Amazon Rekognition Announces Real-Time Face Recognition, Support for Recognition of Text in Image, and Improved Face Detection, AWS: AWS MACH. LEARNING BLOG (Nov. 21, 2017), https://aws
.amazon.com/blogs/machine-learning/amazon-rekognition-announces-real-time
-face-recognition-support-for-recognition-of-text-in-image-and-improved-face
-detection [https://perma.cc/6TKH-5SQ5] (“With this improvement, you can accurately capture demographics and analyze sentiments for all faces in group photos,
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uses of the surveillance system are initially presented as social goods,
or ways to protect citizens from themselves and one another.267 Such
systems tend to keep growing, justifying their expansion through the
promise of ever-greater security.268 And of course, they are always
susceptible to human abuses and biases.269 The end result is a vast expansion in state power at the expense of individual liberty.
The comprehensive surveillance power enabled by facial recognition tracking is the essence of “too permeating police surveillance.”270 It enables the government to know who is present at sensitive events like public protests, religious gatherings, or political
rallies.271 But more than that, it simply reinvents the boundaries between citizen and state—everything you do and everywhere you go
becomes subject to state inspection and scrutiny.272 This type of
crowded events, and public spaces such as airports and department stores.”); see also
Seabrook, supra note 254 (describing “smart retail” applications that can “harvest demographic information from customers’ faces, . . . track and measure ‘dwell time,’” and
assign “sentiment scores” to faces).
267. See Weller, supra note 186, at 59 (describing perception of state surveillance
as beneficial).
268. See Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1371 (2004) (“[H]istory . . . shows the temptation of surveillance
systems to justify an ever-increasing scope of activity . . . .”); Richards, supra note 174,
at 1945. Professor Richard Sobel argues that this trade-off ultimately leads to a less
secure society. See Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National
Identification System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 38 (2002) (“Because the centralization
and monitoring of personal information increases the likelihood of abuses, the power
gained by the government to misuse this information typically outweighs their supposed benefits and degrades political and personal identity.”).
269. Human use of data also gives rise to additional harms, including an increased
likelihood of bias and discrimination. Modern surveillance occurs in three phases:
identification, correlation, and discrimination, and the latter two are done by humans.
See Bruce Schneier, We’re Banning Facial Recognition. We’re Missing the Point., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/opinion/facial
-recognition-ban-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/5XXR-KAMB]. Correlation involves
sorting the population into groups, which naturally leads to discrimination based on
those groups. See Richards, supra note 174, at 1956–58 (citing some of the more notorious instances of this phenomenon, including the sorting of Japanese-Americans during World War II). Although these types of harms are not necessarily Fourth Amendment violations, they are included here as further examples of the potential harms of
government surveillance that arise from the use of data.
270. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)).
271. Gianluca Mezzofiore, Facial Recognition Could Soon Be Used To Identify
Masked Protestors, MASHABLE (Sept. 11, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/09/11/
facial-recognition-masks-protesters [https://perma.cc/WR9G-MLLN]; see also Hartzog, supra note 184.
272. See James B. Rule, “Needs” for Surveillance and the Movement To Protect Privacy, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE STUDIES, supra note 173, at 70 (arguing
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arbitrary power is precisely the type of infringement on individual autonomy that is anathema to the American conception of separation between state and individual that the Bill of Rights was written to protect.273
It is important to note that facial recognition is very likely to have
some role to play in current and future policing.274 Facial recognition
technology is an extremely powerful tool that will improve policing
and protect law enforcement officers.275 Some uses of facial recognition, like identification, are unlikely to violate the Fourth Amendment.276 And it is encouraging that some departments have adopted
procedures governing their use of the technology.277 But the Supreme
Court has rejected the assertion that police departments are free to

that facial recognition and other comprehensive surveillance technologies change
what it means to appear in public).
273. See generally Ku, supra note 149 (arguing that the primary purpose of the
Fourth Amendment was protecting the people from government power); supra Part
I.B.
274. See, e.g., Craig McCarthy, NYPD Pushes Back Against Facial Recognition Ban,
N.Y. POST (Feb. 2, 2020, 2:20 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/02/02/nypd-pushes
-back-against-facial-recognition-ban [https://perma.cc/QA8W-CQ8K] (“Facial recognition is exploding in the private sector, whether or not the Senate wants to ban it for
police, which is asinine in my perspective, the private sector is going to develop and
use it. It’s here and it’s going to expand and that’s the reality of it.” (quoting former
police commissioner Bill Bratton)).
275. For example, in 2017 the FBI used facial recognition to identify and arrest a
member of its Ten Most Wanted list. See Ryan Lucas, How a Tip—and Facial Recognition Technology—Helped the FBI Catch a Killer, NPR (Aug. 21, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2019/08/21/752484720/how-a-tip-and-facial-recognition
-technology-helped-the-fbi-catch-a-killer [https://perma.cc/TC65-YHPC] (describing
FBI’s use of facial recognition technology to capture gang member Walter YovanyGomez). Police departments consistently praise facial recognition as a powerful tool
that will protect the public. See, e.g., DHS SCI. & TECH. DIRECTORATE, MOBILE BIOMETRICS
(2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Mobile%
20Biometrics_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF46-J79J] (asserting facial recognition and
other mobile biometric identifiers will protect police and solve previously unsolved
crimes); James O’Neill, How Facial Recognition Makes You Safer, N.Y. TIMES (June 9,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/09/opinion/facial-recognition-police
-new-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/E5K9-3N46] (discussing how police can utilize
facial recognition software to identify criminals without violating people’s rights).
276. See LAFAVE, supra note 218.
277. See Police Body Worn Cameras: A Policy Scorecard, supra note 62 (listing police
departments that have enacted guidelines for biometrics including facial recognition).
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regulate themselves.278 The Court is responsible for determining the
constitutional floor.279
The Supreme Court has indicated its goal of “preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.”280 A Fourth Amendment analysis that does
not consider police use of a comprehensive record of individual movements to be a “search” is fundamentally at odds with this approach,
because such use represents a tremendous increase in government
power over the individual.281 In light of that, if the Fourth Amendment
is to remain relevant to contemporary life, it must have a role to play
here.282 Carpenter’s new questions and modes of analysis show that
the Court agrees.283 The next Part argues that the proper way to ensure Fourth Amendment protections for comprehensive movement
data like facial recognition tracking is by analyzing the use of that data
as a search.
III. THE WAY FORWARD—APPLYING USE RESTRICTIONS TO
FACIAL RECOGNITION DATA
This Part argues that to protect the Fourth Amendment, courts
should apply the factors described in Carpenter to the use of facial
278. E.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (describing the importance
of judicial oversight to the “often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948))).
279. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Fourth Amendment Gloss, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 701
(2019) (arguing that the Court looks to police practices in determining constitutional
floor).
280. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). Professor Kerr describes the struggle to maintain this
balance as the “equilibrium-adjustment theory” of the Fourth Amendment. See Kerr,
supra note 206. This understanding of the Fourth Amendment recognizes that the role
of the Court is to adjust Fourth Amendment standards as technology changes in order
to maintain a relatively constant balance between the individual and the state. As the
technology underpinning or inhibiting that surveillance develops, judges must strike a
balance. On the one hand, they fear that the unchecked expansion of government
power will lead to a dystopian state. But they also fear that too much limitation on
government power will lead to anarchy. The equilibrium-adjustment theory is their
attempt to solve this problem.
281. See Ku, supra note 149, at 1331 (“[T]he decision to allow law enforcement to
use emerging surveillance technologies is effectively a decision to expand government
power at the expense of the public’s privacy and security.”).
282. See Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Jeffery Rosen &
Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) (arguing that the Court must impose use restrictions to
ensure that the Fourth Amendment remains relevant to modern life).
283. See supra Part I.C.
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recognition tracking data to determine whether a Fourth Amendment
search occurred. Accessing more than seven days of tracking data
should be considered a search under current law,284 but this Note argues that to protect the privacies of life, courts should treat any use of
facial recognition to aggregate location data as a search. This Part concludes by arguing that a use-based approach to facial recognition technology can protect the constitutional rights of citizens while respecting the separation of powers and providing law enforcement with
clear guidelines.
A. APPLYING CARPENTER TO THE USE OF FACIAL RECOGNITION TRACKING
SHOWS SUCH USE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A SEARCH
This Section argues that the application of Carpenter to the use of
facial recognition tracking indicates that such use should be considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Carpenter broadens
the Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy test to include whether society reasonably expects the police to have access to
certain types of information—namely, information that reveals the
whole of a person’s physical movements.285 The use of aggregated facial recognition data implicates this factor in a way that its collection
does not. To ensure the integrity of this constitutionally protected information, courts should apply a Fourth Amendment search analysis
to the use of facial recognition tracking data.286
1. Applying Carpenter to the Aggregation of Movements Using
Facial Recognition Databases
Recall that Carpenter provided three factors that guided its determination that accessing CSLI constituted a search: (1) its “depth,
breadth, and comprehensive reach”; (2) “the inescapable and automatic nature of its collection”; and (3) its “deeply revealing nature.”287
These factors are the key to determining whether law enforcement’s
use of a particular set of data should be treated as a search under the
Fourth Amendment. This Subsection shows how these factors apply
to facial recognition tracking.
284. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 n.3 (2018) (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a
Fourth Amendment search.”).
285. See supra Part I.C.3.
286. See Lipman, supra note 40, at 456 (“[T]he Court should find that certain uses
are Fourth Amendment searches in their own right that can be analyzed for reasonableness independently of their antecedent collection.”).
287. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
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The first Carpenter factor, “depth, breadth, and comprehensive
reach,” considers the size and scope of the data.288 Data obtained via
facial recognition systems possess each one of these qualities. These
systems possess depth because of their precision—they are able to
identify a particular individual at a particular location at a particular
time.289 They possess breadth because they are capable of constantly
recording and identifying individuals, and storing that data indefinitely.290 Finally, they are comprehensive because they are capable of
tracking the whole of the population.291 Thus, facial recognition data
is precisely the type of information implicated by this factor.292
The “comprehensive reach” factor is also concerned with retroactive search capabilities, or the ability of law enforcement to trace
one’s movements from before they were suspected of any crime. In
Carpenter, the Court notes that cell phone records allow police to compile records about a suspect retrospectively.293 This effectively results

288. See supra notes 153–55.
289. See GROTHER ET AL., supra note 13 (describing the rapid improvements in the
accuracy of facial recognition technology); see also Donohue, supra note 41, at 621
(“Images can be read using facial recognition technology, placing particular individuals
in particular places at particular times.”). It is true that facial recognition today remains
imperfect. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. But it is rapidly improving. See
Castelvecchi, supra note 28 (describing rapid improvement in accuracy). And the Carpenter majority acknowledged that it “must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001)).
290. See supra Parts I.B (describing prevalence of cameras throughout American
cities), II.B.1 (describing ease of storing data); see also Hearing, supra note 229 (“Locational tracking by facial recognition (both real time and using stored footage) is technically possible and raises hard Fourth Amendment questions.”).
291. See supra Part I.B (describing vast networks of both cameras and databases);
BAN FACIAL RECOGNITION, supra note 61 (interactive map showing facial recognition surveillance throughout the United States); cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“Critically,
because location information is continually logged for all of the 400 million devices in
the United States . . . this newfound tracking capacity runs against everyone.”).
292. It is important to address the Court’s statement in Carpenter that “[w]e do
not . . . call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220. This statement does not apply to facial
recognition tracking for two reasons. First, facial recognition tracking is not a “conventional surveillance technique[]”—it is a paradigm shift in surveillance, for the reasons
described in Part I.A of this Note. Second, facial recognition tracking implicates each of
the factors described in the majority’s opinion. A finding that the case does not apply
to facial recognition tracking would undermine the majority’s reasoning and the
broader principles it invokes.
293. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (“Unlike with the GPS device in Jones, police need
not even know in advance whether they want to follow a particular individual, or
when.”); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
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in everyone becoming subject to “tireless and absolute surveillance,”
and the “police may . . . call upon the results of that surveillance without regard to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment.”294 The Court
rightfully rejected this dystopian vision in Carpenter, and the principles under which they did so are applicable to facial recognition tracking as well.295
The second Carpenter factor is “the inescapable and automatic
nature” of the collected data.296 Again, this squarely applies to data
collected via facial recognition systems, which can identify a person
merely by their appearing in public.297 As Chief Justice Roberts noted
in Carpenter, “A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment
protection by venturing into the public sphere.”298 A facial recognition
system with cameras on every corner or on every patrolling police officer does not give a person meaningful choice about whether or not
to be recorded. Facial recognition tracking works by aggregating this
data to provide information about a person’s movements. Because the
location data is collected in an “inescapable and automatic nature,” the
second Carpenter factor is met.
It’s worth noting that the concerns posed by the involuntary nature of cell phones are arguably even more true for facial recognition
tracking. In both Riley and Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts marvels at
the degree to which cell phones have become a part of daily life, calling
them “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy.’”299 The Chief Justice cites
this pseudo-anatomical quality as part of the reason that cell phone
tracking “achieves near perfect surveillance” and thus qualifies as an
inescapable and automatic collection.300 A person’s face, of course, is
a feature of human anatomy, inescapably accompanying a person
wherever they go. It is difficult to conceive how one could logically
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical
movements as chronicled in their cell phone (which, despite their popularity, remain an optional accessory) but not have that same expectation based on an actual feature of their anatomy.
concurring) (“The government can store such records and efficiently mine them for
information years into the future.”).
294. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
295. See Hearing, supra note 229, at 10 (“Such a digitally aware Fourth Amendment
[as in Jones, Carpenter, and Riley] would, of course, apply to the problem of facial recognition surveillance and any constitutional challenges to proposed legislation.”).
296. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.
297. See Garvie & Moy, supra note 43.
298. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
299. Id. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
300. Id. at 2218, 2223.
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The third prong of the Carpenter test asks whether a set of data is
of a “deeply revealing nature.”301 Echoing the concerns described in
Justice Sotomayor’s Jones concurrence, this prong seeks to protect the
“privacies of life” by limiting how much the police can learn about a
person.302 The use of facial recognition data to track a person’s movements implicates this factor for the same reasons that using CSLI did
in Carpenter: the use of aggregated data can potentially reveal the
whole of a person’s movements rather than their location at a particular point in time.303 An individual’s Fourth Amendment interest in
avoiding government scrutiny into “an intimate window into [their]
life, revealing . . . the ‘privacies of life’” is not dependent on whether
the data is obtained via cell phone or face.304
Determining whether information is “deeply revealing” on a caseby-case basis is likely unworkable.305 Moreover, just as the “government’s purpose in collecting information does not control whether the
method of collection constitutes a search,”306 the government’s purpose in a given use cannot control whether that use is a search—such
an approach would lead to endless questions about whether a stated
use was pretextual. In Carpenter, the Court held that that accessing
more than seven days of an individual’s movements via CSLI is a
search but declined to decide whether a shorter interval would also
qualify as a search.307 The Court’s decision to cite a particular amount
of time passing in finding that a search occurred without indicating
the specific point at which it became a search leads to questions—at
what point does the aggregation of information become “deeply revealing”? Is it time-based, or could other forms of aggregation constitute a search as well? These remain open questions for CSLI, facial
recognition data, and other types of data that may be implicated by

301. Id. at 2223.
302. See id. at 2217.
303. See id.; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 428 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
304. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
305. The “deeply revealing nature” factor shares this problem with the mosaic theory, because both approaches seek to address the problem that aggregation of information about a person can reveal much more about them than any one piece of that
data. The mosaic theory is much maligned in part because it is so difficult to administer: how is an officer supposed to know the point at which she has compiled a “mosaic”? See Kerr, supra note 108, at 329–33 (describing problems with the mosaic theory including, “What test determines when a mosaic has been created?”).
306. Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 309 (2015) (per curiam).
307. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3 (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to
hold that accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”).
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the Carpenter factors. The next Subsection attempts to analyze these
questions in the case of facial recognition tracking.
2. Aggregation of Location Data Should Be Considered “Deeply
Revealing”
It is unlikely that there is a perfect answer for the point at which
location aggregation becomes deeply revealing, but the practical demands of policing require that courts attempt to provide clear guidance. There are two approaches that courts could take here. First, they
could hold that the aggregation of data spanning some predetermined
amount of time constitutes a search. In Carpenter, the Court indicated
its willingness to use this type of metric to determine whether a search
occurred.308 A second approach is to go further and hold that any aggregation of facial recognition-based location data constitutes a
search.
In determining that a search had occurred in Carpenter, the Court
indicated that seven days of CSLI was sufficient but not necessary.309
The main difficulty with a time-based approach is determining the
amount of time that is necessary. Setting a bright-line rule (e.g., seven
days or twenty-four hours) may be helpful but is somewhat arbitrary,
and the constitutional basis for doing so is not clear. Moreover, many
of the concerns raised by Carpenter are implicated by aggregating
even short periods of a person’s travels.
Time-based approaches attempt to delineate the point at which
the state interest in effective policing gives way to an individual’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches. As discussed
in Part II, it is unlikely that using facial recognition technology to identify a person at a single point would be considered a search,310 and the
regulation of facial identification is a matter for legislatures rather
than the courts. A proponent for a time-based standard would argue
that the aggregation of a single person’s movements over a short period of time (say, while fleeing the scene of a crime) is analogous
enough to existing methods of policing to avoid being a constitutional
violation.311
Should courts choose to use a time-based rule, twenty-four hours
would be superior to seven days. While both are arbitrary, twenty308. See id. at 2217; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) (failing to
articulate an exact point at which GPS monitoring became a search but noting “the line
was surely crossed before the 4-week mark”).
309. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
310. See supra notes 217–24 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text.
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four hours is a better point at which to set the cutoff because it would
do a better job of protecting “deeply revealing information” while still
allowing police to use such data in more typical or emergent instances.
It is significantly more difficult to learn about a person’s life based on
their travels over the course of a single day than over the course of a
week.
A second route is holding that any aggregation of location data
constitutes a search. Under this theory, using any sort of facial recognition tracking would require a warrant, whether it was over five
minutes or five weeks. The reasoning behind this approach is that location information is inherently deeply revealing, even over very
short periods. Some courts have endorsed the principle of this approach in holding that the procurement of any CSLI by the state requires a warrant.312
The disadvantage of holding any aggregation of location data to
be a search is that it may be overinclusive—requiring a warrant for
short bursts of location monitoring is more restrictive than analogous
methods in the pre-digital age. However, because many of those analogues are themselves suspect under a power-based/original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, this Note argues that the second
route is the better of the two options. Therefore, courts should hold
that any aggregation of facial recognition data to track a person’s
movements is a Fourth Amendment search.
Regardless of the viability of either of these approaches, the use
of facial recognition records to track an individual for more than seven
days should be considered a search under Carpenter, where the Court
held that accessing seven days of CSLI records constituted a search.313
For the reasons described above, the factors that the Court used to determine that CSLI was protected apply to facial recognition tracking
as well.314 So, because facial recognition tracking implicates the Carpenter factors in the same way as CSLI, the use of more than seven
days of facial recognition tracking should constitute a search under
current law.

312. See, e.g., Zanders v. State, 118 N.E.3d 736, 739 (Ind. 2019) (“Carpenter made
clear that seven days’ or more worth of CSLI accessed constitutes a search—and also
left open the possibility that accessing even fewer days of CSLI could constitute a
search. This means that the State generally must obtain a warrant before procuring a
person’s CSLI.”); United States v. Kealoha, No. 17-00582, 2019 WL 573409, at *2 (D.
Haw. Feb. 12, 2019) (“Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI.” (quoting Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222)).
313. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
314. See supra Part III.A.
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The main counterargument to this proposal is that the use of facial recognition data is not a search because it occurs after the data
has already been collected. This issue goes to the heart of the discussion distinguishing between data collection and use. Under the old,
pre-Carpenter rules, this argument may have been correct. The fact
that the collection itself did not constitute a search would have absolved law enforcement from constitutional scrutiny. However, as discussed throughout this Note, facial recognition tracking is precisely
the type of digital innovation addressed in Carpenter. The inclusion of
the “deeply revealing nature” factor shows that the Court has recognized that data can be constitutionally protected based on what it may
reveal as well as how it was collected.
The fulcrum on which this argument rests is the degree to which
the aggregation of data can provide new and better information than
the data can provide in isolation. Those that argue that there is no
need to consider use restrictions are effectively arguing that there is
no difference between a policeman on the beat jotting down notes
about one’s movements and an army of cameras creating an eternal
record of movements for every person in the city. This Note asserts
that there is a difference,315 and a practical consideration of Fourth
Amendment rights must account for it.
A second counterargument posits that police will only have access to data that was collected in public areas, and because a person
does not have any sort of reasonable expectation of privacy in public,
then anything captured in public is fair game for law enforcement. But
each of these premises is flawed.
First, there could be cameras both inside buildings and out. Private businesses as well as public entities may choose to employ facial
recognition identification, and businesses may voluntarily (or potentially be required to) hand such records over to police at their request.
Second, as the Court noted in Carpenter, a person does not forego
Fourth Amendment protection simply by appearing in public. As discussed, comprehensive surveillance technologies like CSLI and facial
recognition have the ability to capture vast amounts of information at
low cost, creating the possibility of “tireless and absolute surveillance”
for police.316 Because “[a] person does not surrender all Fourth
Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere,” it is no
longer clear that the fact that information was collected in public renders it free from constitutional scrutiny.317
315. See supra Part II.B.
316. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
317. Id. at 2217.
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B. THIS APPROACH BALANCES FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND BROADER
PUBLIC POLICY
Applying use restrictions to facial recognition tracking strikes the
proper balance between the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual and the broader interests of society. As discussed in Part I, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is currently in the process of reckoning
with these changes.318
There are benefits to both security and liberty in permitting
broad collection of data and scrutinizing its use. When bulk data is collected, any one data point is unlikely to reveal much information.319
As discussed throughout this Note, it is the aggregation and use of that
data by the police that can raise concerns related to both privacy and
liberty.320 As a result, it is possible to design a surveillance system that
can reap the benefits of data aggregation while still protecting the individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution by shifting the primary focus of the law from collection to use.321
This approach recognizes the constitutional rights of individuals
by ensuring that the Fourth Amendment plays an oversight role for
modern policing. The Fourth Amendment commands that searches be
reasonable.322 By recognizing the use of facial recognition data to
track individuals as a search, this rule ensures that the Fourth Amendment will remain relevant to current and future policing. It recognizes
that the unrestrained use of a massive surveillance apparatus based
on the recording of Americans’ faces can threaten every individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, an analysis that accounts for use continues the Court’s effort to ensure the “preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted.”323
Relatedly, a use-based approach provides constitutional oversight to the use of facial recognition data that the government collects
from third parties. Many private entities also collect data through
318. See supra Part I.C.
319. Kerr, supra note 206, at 7–8 (“[C]omputer surveillance and modern camera
surveillance tend to work by gathering more information that is less invasive per datum . . . .”).
320. See supra Part II.B.
321. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 206, at 7 (“To reap those benefits [of surveillance
systems], the best way to design surveillance systems is to allow the initial collection
but then place sharp limits on the later stages such as disclosure.”).
322. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
323. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); see also Carpenter v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018) (quoting Kyllo).
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facial recognition technology.324 Though the future of the third-party
doctrine is somewhat uncertain in light of Carpenter, it is difficult to
imagine banning the police from accessing third-party records at
all.325 The Constitution does not regulate the ability of private entities
to engage in such collection. This fact once again underscores the importance of focusing on how that information is used when considering questions of surveillance.
This approach also is cognizant of the government interests at
stake. First, applying Carpenter to the use of facial recognition data
tracking rather than deeming all facial recognition collection a search
properly reserves the question of how to comprehensively regulate
facial recognition technology to the legislature.326 There are a number
of questions legislatures must consider regarding facial recognition
technology, beginning with whether to allow it at all.327 At the time of
this writing, some cities328 and states329 have decided to ban the use
324. See, e.g., SCHNEIER, supra note 183 (“In countries like the United States, [the
surveillance apparatus] is being built by corporations in order to influence our buying
behavior, and is incidentally used by the government.”); see also Seabrook, supra note
254 (“Where the U.S. leads the world is in the commercial use of face recognition by
private companies.”). For an excellent discussion of the role of surveillance as a driver
of the modern technology economy, see generally SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019).
325. A full exploration of this concept would require an extensive discussion of the
third-party doctrine, including its viability following Carpenter, both of which are outside the scope of this Note. It is sufficient for present purposes to assert that there is a
reasonable chance the police will continue to be able to access records created in the
private sector, including facial databases. See supra notes 143, 145.
326. See supra note 229.
327. Note that the legislative question of whether to allow police to use facial
recognition technology is a distinct question from whether that use is prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment.
328. San Francisco was the first major American city to ban government use of facial recognition. See Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco
Bans Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes
.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/
L29T-CQCR]. Somerville, Massachusetts, and Oakland, California, followed. See Caroline Haskins, Oakland Becomes Third U.S. City To Ban Facial Recognition, VICE (July 17,
2019, 6:41 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zmpaex/oakland-becomes
-third-us-city-to-ban-facial-recognition-xz [https://perma.cc/S72L-3UCQ]. For an updated map of cities that have banned the technology, see supra note 61.
329. In October 2019, California passed the Body Camera Accountability Act (AB
1215), banning the use of facial recognition technology in police-worn body cameras
for three years. See Anderson, supra note 62; The Body Camera Accountability Act (AB
1215), ACLU S. CAL., https://www.aclusocal.org/en/legislation/body-camera
-accountability [https://perma.cc/J76V-Z6MF]. The Massachusetts legislature voted
to ban police use of facial recognition, but Governor Charlie Baker refused to sign the
legislation into law. Adi Robertson, Massachusetts Governor Won’t Sign Facial
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of facial recognition technology by law enforcement, while others
have embraced it.330
Additionally, the approach described here is pragmatic. It balances the invasiveness of facial recognition technology with the public
interest in allowing some uses of the technology. The use-based approach advocated here allows much of law enforcement’s use of facial
recognition to go forward as it would under the current model (e.g.,
identification on the street is not a search or is a reasonable search).
But when the use becomes sufficiently invasive, as it does with tracking, the government must justify its actions.331
Finally, this approach is administrable. It provides clear notice to
police departments that attempts to use facial recognition data to
track individuals are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.332 Departments are already developing standard operating procedures for
the use of facial recognition,333 and the approach described here can
easily be conveyed to rank-and-file officers through the use of SOPs
and similar documents. Importantly, this rule does not attempt to
deny police departments the benefits of facial recognition technology
altogether by deeming the collection of facial data or identification using that data to be an unconstitutional search.
C. OF WARRANTS AND REASONABLENESS—TWO PATHS
Once it is determined that the information at issue meets the Carpenter test, the use of that information is a search. But what then? The
Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.334
The Court’s typical approach has been to deem searches in the criminal context per se unreasonable in the absence of a warrant, with
Recognition Ban, VERGE (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/16/
22179245/facial-recognition-bill-ban-rejected-massachusetts-governor-charlie
-baker-police-accountability [https://perma.cc/K6XN-TKBB]. Other states have introduced similar legislation; for an up-to-date overview of facial recognition policies at
the state level, see State Facial Recognition Policy, EPIC, https://epic.org/state-policy/
facialrecognition [https://perma.cc/J9U9-PRQ9].
330. See supra Part I.B (describing cities that have embraced facial recognition
technology).
331. Importantly, as the Court recognized in Riley, there is a distinction between
preventing such searches altogether and the warrant requirement. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a
cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required
before such a search . . . .”).
332. Id. at 398 (“[O]ur general preference [is] to provide clear guidance to law enforcement through categorical rules.”).
333. See, e.g., CRIME INTEL. UNIT, supra note 256.
334. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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some exceptions.335 As many commentators have observed, this approach has likely made the Court reluctant to label a given practice a
search, because the warrant requirement is severe.336
In Carpenter, after determining that a search had occurred, the
Court held that a warrant was required without much discussion.337
The warrant requirement for anything deemed a search in the criminal context is an even poorer fit in the post-Carpenter world, where
the Fourth Amendment applies to searches of information.338 This is
apparent in how the lower courts have applied Carpenter, generally
seeking to limit it to the facts of that case.339 The tension between the
lofty principles articulated throughout Carpenter and the reality of
modern policing suggests that the Court will eventually need to reconsider the warrant requirement in the context of digital searches.
The Court has two paths to choose from. On the one hand, it could
continue on course and deem Carpenter searches of facial recognition
databases per se unreasonable without a warrant. If that’s the case,
the analysis ends here—the officer must obtain a warrant supported
335. See Riley, 573 U.S. at 382 (“Our cases have determined that ‘[w]here a search
is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.’ . . . In the
absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception
to the warrant requirement.” (first and second alterations in original) (citation omitted)).
336. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974) (“[The] all-or-nothing approach to the amendment puts
extraordinary strains upon the process of drawing its outer boundary lines.”); Akhil
Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 769 (1994) (“Because it creates an unreasonable mandate for all searches, the warrant requirement
leads judges to artificially constrain the scope of the Amendment itself by narrowly
defining ‘search’ and ‘seizure.’”). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo v.
United States, noted this tendency himself. 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“But in fact we have
held that visual observation is no ‘search’ at all—perhaps in order to preserve somewhat more intact our doctrine that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.”).
337. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“Having found that
the acquisition of Carpenter’s CSLI was a search, we also conclude that the Government
must generally obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such
records.”).
338. See Alan Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter,
128 YALE L.J.F. 943, 944 (2019) (arguing that “Carpenter’s embrace of a categorical
warrant requirement was a mistake”). Professor Rozenshtein also points out the difficulty of applying the warrant requirement to emerging police techniques where the
identity of a given individual may not be known at the outset of the investigation. See
id. at 951.
339. Id. at 950–51 nn.33–40 (summarizing how courts are narrowly applying Carpenter).
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by probable cause to conduct the search or it is inadmissible under the
exclusionary rule.340 Alternatively, the Court could continue the restoration of Fourth Amendment principles embodied in the Carpenter
shift by returning to the language of the Fourth Amendment and asking whether the search was reasonable.
There is strong support for an approach based on reasonableness. First, the text of the Fourth Amendment itself prevents unreasonable searches.341 Second, the Court has acknowledged it in its jurisprudence, noting that the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness.”342 Finally, an approach that centers on reasonableness would enable the application of the Fourth Amendment to the
array of searches that current jurisprudence does not consider as
such, including the identification of an individual using facial recognition technology.343
Professor Alan Rozenshtein provides a helpful framework for
contrasting these two approaches. In his article Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness After Carpenter, Professor Rozenshtein contrasts selective and regulatory approaches to the Fourth Amendment.344 The
selective approach is “a narrow-scope, high-requirements position
that captures much of contemporary Fourth Amendment doctrine.”345
The regulatory approach, in contrast, embraces the view that “[t]he
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”346 This approach would apply the Fourth Amendment to a much broader range
of activity, but would weigh the interests of the government against
the rights of the individual in determining whether a given search was
reasonable.347 Professor Slobogin describes this concept as the

340. See Bernard A. Berkman & Gerald S. Gold, Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence, 5 AM. JUR. TRIALS 331 (2020).
341. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”).
342. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 381 (2014) (“As the text makes clear, ‘the
ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness.”’” (citations omitted)); Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015) (“The reasonableness of a
search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose
of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations.”).
343. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
344. Rozenshtein, supra note 338, at 949–52.
345. Id. at 949.
346. Id. at 952.
347. Id.
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“proportionality principle.”348 At its core, this approach embraces an
idea that is both intuitive and fundamentally reasonable: some
searches are more justified than others.
A Fourth Amendment analysis based on reasonableness, rather
than on the present search/non-search binary, would have implications for the assertions made throughout this Note. Most significantly,
a number of “identification” scenarios, which would not be searches
under current doctrine, would likely be considered searches.349
Should the Court travel down this road, it would be a sea-change
for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. That probably makes it unlikely in the near term. However, it is nevertheless worth mentioning
here because the realities of the digital age will continue to exert pressure on the Court to consider aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence it has long taken for granted.
Note too that this approach is by no means fantasy, nor is it unworkable. Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville
showed what a judicial application of this model might look like.350
Additionally, courts could look to legislative guidance to determine
whether a given practice is generally held to be reasonable.351 Professors Maria Ponomarenko and Barry Friedman convincingly argue that
the public can and should set rules for how the police operate.352 As
the public decides, through the legislative process, how it wants the
police to use facial recognition technology, the contours of what constitutes a reasonable search will become clearer.
A full exploration of the warrant requirement and its downstream effects is well beyond the scope of this Note. And to be sure, a
model where the Court determines that law enforcement must obtain
a warrant to conduct a search using certain kinds of facial recognition
data would be an improvement over the pre-Carpenter state of affairs,
where the Fourth Amendment played no role in such an analysis.
However, an embrace of reasonableness as the touchstone of the
348. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 17 (2007) (“[W]hen contemplating surveillance (or any

other investigative technique), government should be required to provide justification
proportionate to the intrusiveness of the surveillance . . . .”).
349. But importantly, many such scenarios would likely be considered reasonable
searches and thus not Fourth Amendment violations.
350. 900 F.3d 521, 527, 529 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that a Carpenter search had
occurred in collection of smart meter data, but applying a reasonableness balancing
test to determine that search was reasonable).
351. See supra note 229.
352. See Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1827 (2015).
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Fourth Amendment would enable the Court to continue to extend the
principles it invoked in Carpenter and provide constitutional oversight to the myriad surveillance methods, including facial recognition
technology, that are available to modern law enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Facial recognition tracking has the potential to change the nature
of public spaces. In the not-so-distant future, a rapidly developing system of cameras and databases will make it possible for data showing
all public movements to be recorded and stored. Facial recognition
tracking is the aggregation of that data to reveal the whole of an individual’s movements, and thus provide the government with a portrait
of their life. This Note shows that courts can and should analyze law
enforcement’s use of facial recognition technology to track individuals
as a search under the Fourth Amendment. In Carpenter, the Supreme
Court signaled that it is changing its approach to applying the Fourth
Amendment to police investigations conducted with sophisticated
modern technologies. Facial recognition systems are one such technology. Courts should hold that the use of facial recognition data to
track individuals is a search under Carpenter because such data are
comprehensive, collected involuntarily, and when aggregated, reveal
the privacies of life. This approach ensures that the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution remains a relevant protection for the American people in the digital age.

